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ADMINISTRATING PATENT LITIGATION
Jacob S. Sherkow *
Abstract: Recent patent litigation reform efforts have focused on every branch of
government—Congress, the President, and the federal courts—save the fourth:
administrative agencies. Agencies, however, possess a variety of functions in patent
litigation: they serve as “gatekeepers” to litigation in federal court; they provide scientific
and technical expertise to patent disputes; they review patent litigation to fulfill their own
mandates; and they serve, in several instances, as entirely alternative fora to federal litigation.
Understanding administrative agencies’ functions in managing or directing, i.e.,
“administrating,” patent litigation sheds both descriptive and normative insight on several
aspects of patent reform. These include several problems inherent in patent litigation
generally, and ways of fixing them that focus less on the identities or characteristics of
litigants and more on agencies’ (and courts’) institutional incentives. This Article
synoptically describes the functions of administrative agencies in patent litigation, elucidates
several problems with agencies’ operation of those functions, and provides several cheap,
easy, and politically viable solutions to better administrating patent litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent efforts to reform patent litigation have involved every branch
of the federal government. Congress, after repeated calls to action, 1
passed the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, the largest and most
expansive overhaul to the patent statute in almost sixty years. 2 The
White House, an office not well known for influencing patent policy, 3
announced a multipart executive initiative aimed at curbing some of the
abuses of the patent system. 4 And the federal judiciary—especially the
Supreme Court—has been busy crafting new doctrines and modifying
old ones in an attempt to shape patent litigation. 5
But despite this wide marshalling of federal resources, one branch
remains curiously absent from the chorus of patent litigation reform:
administrative agencies. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
while admirably vocal in its efforts to improve patent issuance, has

1. E.g., Susan Decker, Patent Fights Create Too Much Litigation, Google Lawyer Says, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, July 27, 2011, at 2D (describing tech companies “calling on Congress and the
Federal Trade Commission to rein in lawsuits”); Michael Fitzgerald, Op-Ed., A Patent Is Worth
Having, Right? Well, Maybe Not, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at A3 (“Congress could step
in . . . reining in litigation and damage awards. But this marks the third consecutive year that
Congress has considered patent reform, and there is enough opposition from large companies to
suggest that it will again have to wait until next year.”); Jessica Guynn, Google Bids for Nortel
Patents, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at B2 (“[Google] has also advocated for patent litigation reform,
although Congress has yet to act.”); Jim Landers, Trouble Impending in Patent Process, DALL.
MORNING NEWS, May 1, 2007, at 1D (describing technologies companies’ efforts in persuading
Congress to reform patent litigation damages).
2. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
3. But see Colleen Chien, Senior Advisor for Intellectual Prop. & Innovation, Office of Sci. &
Tech. Policy, Keynote Address at the Stanford Law School Patent Trolls and Patent Reform
Conference (Mar. 26, 2014), available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iIPdc6U_l6g
(describing the patent reform initiatives of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Truman, Franklin D.
Roosevelt, and Madison).
4. Protecting American Inventors and Innovators, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://perma.cc/CC6LG6J4 (last visited May 8, 2014) [hereinafter PROTECTING INVENTORS].
5. E.g., Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014)
(realigning the standard for awarding attorneys’ fees in “exceptional cases”); Nautilus, Inc. v.
Biosig Instruments, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014) (reassessing the standard for
ambiguous claim interpretation); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct.
2347 (2014) (reviewing the doctrine of patentable subject matter).
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largely disclaimed a role in reforming patent litigation.6 Non-PTO
administrative agencies, meanwhile, have remained mostly silent on the
issue. 7 And the recent legislative, executive, and judicial efforts in the
area have largely ignored the variety of roles administrative agencies—
especially agencies other than the PTO—play in patent litigation. 8
This silence is not because administrative agencies have little invested
in patent law. To the contrary, agencies have recently been playing
increasingly important roles in patent policy debates.9 And there has also
been an increase in several specialized species of patent litigation that
directly involve non-PTO agency adjudication. 10 How agencies
6. See, e.g., David Kappos, Dir. of the USPTO, Keynote Address at the Center for American
Progress (Nov. 20, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/4ER9-PBJY (“The fact is, the explosion of
innovation—and follow-on litigation—that we see across consumer electronics hardware and
software is a direct reflection of how our patent system wires us for innovation. It’s both natural and
reasonable that in a fast-growing, competitive market, innovators would seek to protect their
breakthroughs using our patent system.”). Recently, however, the PTO has placed links to several
patent litigation resources on its website. See Resources, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/litigation/Resources.jsp (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
7. Within the past decade, no non-PTO agencies—other than the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)—have issued any notices published in the Federal Register concerning patent litigation
reform. See, e.g., Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Extension of
Public Comment Period, 78 Fed. Reg. 71613 (Nov. 29, 2013) (requesting comments concerning
patent assertion entities in the wireless communications sector); Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment Request, 78 Fed. Reg. 61352 (Oct. 3, 2013) (same);
Statement of Regulatory Priorities, 74 Fed. Reg. 64363 (Dec. 7, 2009) (setting forth policy on
reverse payment settlements).
8. Regarding the PTO, Congress did not vest it with any substantive rule-making authority in the
America Invents Act, despite repeated, vocal calls to do so. Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing
Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1998 (2013)
(“Moreover, the AIA declined to grant the PTO the robust substantive rule-making powers that had
been proposed in earlier versions of the legislation.”). The White House’s current initiatives
regarding the PTO have encouraged various forms of data-sharing and crowd-sourcing, but do little
in the way of patent litigation. See PROTECTING INVENTORS, supra note 4. And the Supreme Court
has refused to revisit the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision in Animal Legal
Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920 (Fed. Cir. 1991), which stripped the PTO of all substantive rulemaking authority. See generally Sarah Tran, Administrative Law, Patents, and Distorted Rules, 80
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 831 (2012) (discussing the history of the case and its progeny).
As for other administrative agencies, these patent litigation reform efforts have been mostly
silent. No agencies, besides the PTO, are directly mentioned in the AIA or the President’s
Protecting American Inventors and Innovators initiative. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011); PROTECTING INVENTORS, supra note 4. There have been
virtually no judicial decisions regarding the extent of other agencies’ substantive authority in patent
disputes. See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1670,
1677 n.2 (2012) (declining to express a view on whether the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
possesses only a “ministerial” role in managing the Orange Book). Disclosure: The author
represented Novo Nordisk in this dispute.
9. See generally Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations
for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237 (2012) (discussing how various administrative
agencies—other than the PTO—have contributed and can contribute to patent policy-making).
10. See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98
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function—and should function—in patent litigation is consequently
becoming an increasingly important area of patent litigation reform. 11
To that end, this Article provides an account of administrative
agencies in patent litigation missing from patent reform proposals and
current scholarship. It provides a synoptic view of the functions that
administrative agencies currently play in patent litigation; it describes
some of the problems with this involvement; and it provides several
cheap, easy, and politically available tools to solve them. Specifically,
this Article provides a framework for when and how agencies should—
and should not—become involved in patent litigation, either as parties,
as experts, or as traditional rule-making authorities. This prescription
ultimately seeks to better “administrate” patent litigation. 12
Indeed, administrative agencies currently have a variety of roles in
administrating patent litigation. From “litigation gatekeepers” with the
authority to “oversee and manage private litigation efforts,”13 to
scientific and technical experts,14 to bodies of post-adjudicatory
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2012) (calculating the rise of patent disputes adjudicated by the
International Trade Commission (ITC)); Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of
Follow-On Biologics, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 9, 11 (2012) (examining the “potential for patent
conflict every time a follow-on biologic enters the market” given the divided authority for managing
follow-on biologics between the FDA and the PTO); Henry Grabowski, Are the Economics of
Pharmaceutical Research and Development Changing?: Productivity, Patents and Political
Pressures, 22 (Supp. 2) PHARMACOECONOMICS 15, 19–21 (2004) (describing the increase in HatchWaxman Act litigation involving the FDA); Bureau of Competition, Agreements Filed with the
Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2012 (2013),
http://perma.cc/H7EY-2QYP (describing the increase in the FTC’s review of pharmaceutical drug
patent litigation settlements).
11. See Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 279 (2011) (“The time
has come to consider reorienting patent law’s institutional arrangements to bring them more into
line with the rest of the administrative state. And the most straightforward means of achieving this
would be for Congress to endow the PTO with substantive rule-making authority.”).
12. Cf. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 163 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “administrate” to mean “[t]o
manage or direct (affairs)”).
13. David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 619
(2013); see, e.g., Caraco, 132 S. Ct. at 1676 (discussing the FDA’s management of the Orange
Book); Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding and Incentivizing Biosimilars, 64 HASTINGS
L.J. 57, 69–74 (2012) (discussing similar authority invested in the FDA regarding biosimilar patent
litigation); Eric J. Rogers, Ten Years of Inter Partes Patent Reexamination Appeals: An Empirical
View, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 305, 318–21 (2013) (calculating the effect
of PTO reexamination requests on stays of district court litigation); Note, Recasting the U.S.
International Trade Commission’s Role in the Patent System, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2337, 2354–55
(2013) (discussing the operation of mandatory district court stays on parallel ITC patent litigation).
14. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Bock, Neutral Litigants in Patent Cases, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 233, 289–
90 (2014) (describing the FTC’s expertise in patent disputes); Sapna Kumar, Expert Court, Expert
Agency, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1589–92 (2011) (describing the ITC’s expertise in patent
disputes); Rai, supra note 9, at 1241 (recounting the National Institute of Health’s (NIH’s)
involvement in the Myriad Genetics litigation concerning gene patents).

09 - Sherkow - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

2015]

ADMINISTRATING PATENT LITIGATION

4/13/2015 11:54 AM

209

review, 15 to alternative venues, 16 administrative agencies appear to have
wide-ranging functions in a broad number of patent disputes.
Furthermore, these administrative proceedings take place over a broad
stretch of a patent dispute’s life cycle, from the initial complaint,
through trial and settlement, and even beyond. This descriptive account
of agency functions in patent litigation challenges the widely held notion
that federal courts alone have the authoritative say over who may sue for
patent infringement, where, and how. 17
Unsurprisingly, agency administration of patent litigation is not
without its own set of problems. As with other private interactions with
agencies, agency administration of patent litigation suffers from
“regulatory gamesmanship,” 18 industry and political capture, 19
adjudicatory uncertainty, 20 and inconsistent judgments. 21 These
15. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227–28 (2013)
(discussing the FTC’s review of “reverse payment” or “pay-to-delay” patent settlements); Tony V.
Pezzano & Jeffrey M. Telep, Latest Developments on Injunctive Relief for Infringement of FRANDEncumbered SEPS—Part III, 26 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 21, 21–22 (2014) (discussing the law
concerning the U.S. Trade Representative’s review of ITC Section 337 patented import
investigations).
16. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34
CARDOZO L. REV. 249, 272–74 (2012) (characterizing the rise in citizen petitions before the FDA,
including those concerning issues related to patent infringement); Chien & Lemley, supra note 10,
at 2–3 (discussing the rise in the ITC as an alternative venue for patent disputes); Diane H. Crawley,
America Invents Act: Promoting Progress or Spurring Secrecy?, 36 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 11–12
(2014) (describing the newly formed post-grant review and inter partes review proceedings before
the PTO as an additional “arsenal of weapons available to third parties in attacking a patent”).
17. See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 55 (2014)
(“Under a long-standing regime of exclusive jurisdiction, only the federal courts can hear patent
cases and develop expertise.”).
18. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87 TEX. L.
REV. 685, 687 (2009) (“We define ‘regulatory gaming’ as private behavior that harnesses
procompetitive or neutral regulations and uses them for exclusionary purposes. . . . The
pharmaceutical industry has witnessed this behavior for years, as branded drug companies have
used exclusionary tactics to stay one step ahead of generic entry.”).
19. See Gugliuzza, supra note 17, at 43 n.187 (discussing the U.S. Trade Representative’s
overturning of the ITC’s injunction against certain Apple, Inc. products); Janice M. Mueller, Patent
Misuse Through the Capture of Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 666–67 (2002)
(discussing the FTC’s controversial consent decree in In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 F.T.C. 616
(1996))); Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes—Proposals for Decreasing
Traffic Congestion in the Patent Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 119, 137 (2005) (“[T]he Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) approval process [is influenced by] . . . a powerful congressional lobby
that has obtained provisions to extend a pharmaceutical patent’s term beyond the twenty-year period
because of the additional dead period due to the FDA regulatory approval process.”); Zach Carter,
The Spoilsmen: How Congress Corrupted Patent Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 4, 2011, 5:12
AM), http://perma.cc/P42T-TGP4 (discussing banks’ political influence on patent reform efforts).
20. See Aaron Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, 28 ANTITRUST 16, 16 (2013) (describing
uncertainties that remain in the FTC’s approval of “reverse payment” or “pay-to-delay” patent
settlements); Stu Woolman, Elliot Fishman, & Michael Fisher, Evidence of Patent Thickets in
Complex Biopharmaceutical Technologies, 53 IDEA 1, 14 n.62 (2013) (“Despite the strength of the
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problems, to be sure, are neither new nor unique to patent litigation. But
patent litigation—given the putatively regulatory nature of the patent
right itself 22—gives these problems a texture all their own. Poor agency
administration of patent litigation affects patent holders as well as
accused infringers, 23 delays litigation, 24 slows investment, 25 and makes
settlement problematic.26 Parties facing patent lawsuits where agencies

US patent regime, the variability of FDA approval for a drug, difference in judicial recognition as to
whether a patent obtains in a given set of circumstances, and the success that the producers of
generic drugs have had despite the presence of an applicable patent, dampens enthusiasm for new
research and development projects that would bring much needed pharmaceuticals to market.”
(citing Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1737,
1743 (2011))).
21. See Gugliuzza, supra note 17, at 43–44 (discussing the negative effect of agency litigation on
adjudicative uniformity); Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the
ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 538–40 (2009) (discussing conflicting judgments at the ITC).
22. See Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 110
(2013) (“Is intellectual property (IP) a ‘Mother, may I?’ regime? The answer is complex. . . . It is at
once a basis around which we can contract and allow the spread of new ideas and a government
regulatory intervention in the marketplace that is designed to restrict what people can do with their
own ideas and their own property.” (emphasis in original)).
23. See Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 219, 234–
37 (2011) (describing the effect of inter partes review at the PTO on plaintiffs and defendants);
Bock, supra note 14, at 250–51 (“The presence of the ITC staff attorney as a neutral third party
litigant creates a litigation dynamic in Section 337 actions that is different from district court
litigation.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Patent Settlements and the Supreme Court’s
Actavis Decision, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 3, 20–22 (2014) (discussing the effects on both
plaintiffs and defendants on invalidity arguments in light of the FTC’s scrutiny of reverse payment
settlements); Mark Lyon & Sarah Piepmeier, ITC Section 337 Investigations: Patent Infringement
Claims, GIBSON DUNN 4 (2011), http://perma.cc/WF4Q-T277 (“The typical plaintiff-defendant
dynamic is quite different when a neutral third party is also participating in the litigation. The
Staff’s participation can be to a party’s benefit or detriment, depending on the circumstances, and
underestimating the Staff’s importance and role is a typical and sometimes costly mistake for new
ITC litigants.”).
24. See, e.g., Affinity Labs of Tex. v. Apple Inc., No. 09-04436 CW, 2010 WL 1753206, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2010) (“As of December 31, 2009, the average length of an inter partes
reexamination is 36.2 months. The average length of delay is likely to increase considering the
steady rise in the number of reexaminations filed in the past several years.” (emphasis in original));
S. Peter Ludwig et al., Hatch-Waxman in the Federal Courts: From 1994–2004, 31 DRUG DEV.
INDUS. PHARMACY 215, 221 (2005) (describing the length of Hatch-Waxman litigation). But see
Kumar, supra note 21, at 536–37 (discussing the relative speed of ITC patented import proceedings
compared to district court litigation).
25. See Jorge L. Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based Patent
Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 92 (2013) (describing investment uncertainty in the face of FTC
involvement in certain patent disputes); Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in
Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
419, 436–43 (2012) (describing investment uncertainty regarding the FDA and biosimilar patents);
Woolman, Fishman, & Fisher, supra note 20, at 14 n.62 (listing the discouragement of certain
research and development under Hatch-Waxman Act litigation).
26. See Edlin et al., supra note 20, at 16; Hovenkamp, supra note 23, at 16–20.
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are involved frequently get more than they bargained for. 27
Despite these complexities, administrative agencies possess—and can
make better use of—a number of discretionary tools, currently at their
disposal, to better administrate patent litigation. The first, perhaps
ironically, is to become more involved in patent litigation ex ante. Some
of the problems raised by agency administration of patent disputes,
namely regulatory gamesmanship, settlement uncertainty, and
inconsistent judgments, could be ameliorated through greater and more
forceful oversight of private patent disputes before they arise. 28
Administrative agencies currently possess a variety of mechanisms to do
precisely this: to delay regulatory review during the pendency of a patent
suit, 29 to control the timing of parallel district court litigation,30 and to
use “march in rights” to control the direction of unfavorable litigation. 31
Tailoring these powers in certain, limited circumstances would limit
many of the problems associated with the current regime. 32
The second tool at agencies’ disposal is their own expertise. A
number of agencies involved in patent litigation possess special
scientific or technical expertise, often at the cutting-edge of scientific
and legal development. 33 Sometimes, however, such expertise can get
co-opted or captured by industry forces or political opportunism. 34 By
publicly and repeatedly deploying such expertise—either as litigants,
counsel to other government agencies, or by issuing reports on
developing areas of science and technology—agencies could
demonstrate their independence and stave off later attempts at industry
and political capture. 35
Lastly, where patent litigation proceeds in parallel between federal
courts and administrative agencies—such as section 337 patented import
proceedings before the International Trade Commission (ITC) and “post-

27. See Contreras, supra note 25, at 50–52 (describing the increase in patent litigation over “fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory” patent licensing commitments); Kanter & Feldman, supra note
13, at 77–78 (discussing the patent litigation difficulties facing biosimilar manufacturers); Lyon &
Piepmeier, supra note 23, at 4 (“[U]nderestimating the [ITC’s] Staff’s importance and role is a
typical and sometimes costly mistake for new ITC litigants.”).
28. Cf. Engstrom, supra note 13, at 657–63 (discussing agencies as optimal “litigation
gatekeepers”); Rai, supra note 9, at 1242–43 (discussing some of the benefits of patent policymaking ex ante).
29. See infra notes 50–71 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 79–92 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 266–273 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part A.
33. See infra Part B.
34. See infra Parts B–C.
35. See infra Part B.

09 - Sherkow - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

212

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:54 AM

[Vol. 90:205

issuance proceedings” before the PTO—agencies (and courts) should
use their discretionary power to narrow potential claimants, strengthen
estoppel between the two fora, and streamline litigation stays. This
would principally avoid inconsistent judgments, but may even provide a
check against regulatory gamesmanship while contributing to settlement
certainty. 36
By taking this approach to reforming patent litigation, this Article
seeks to contribute to—and synthesize—a variety of disparate strands of
scholarship. One strand concerns the legal nature of the patent right,
giving rise to the current, heated debate as to whether patents are better
characterized as regulatory instruments or as traditional parcels of
property. 37 By focusing on concrete examples of regulatory involvement
in patent litigation, this Article strengthens the view of patents-asregulation without philosophizing over expansive definitions of
“property.” 38 Scholars have also recently begun to explore the limits of
the public-law nature of patent litigation, highlighting the public’s
interest in invalidity defenses, 39 remedies, 40 and standing. 41 This Article
contributes to this strand of scholarship as well, by acknowledging and
examining the role that regulatory actors—i.e., public bodies—play in
determining private patent rights. Lastly, much has been written on
“patent reform,” a topic as broad-ranging as any in intellectual property
today. 42 This Article also hopes to contribute to this scholarship by
advancing reform proposals for a small but increasingly important and
36. See infra Part III.
37. Compare Mark A. Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92 TEX. L. REV.
SEE ALSO 107, 107–08 (2014) (“Modern IP is certainly more like regulation than it is like property,
at least as people traditionally think of property, though there are certain kinds of property that have
regulatory characteristics because they are used to define markets or restrict entry.”), and Lemley,
supra note 22, at 110 (advancing the patents-as-regulation argument), with Richard A. Epstein, The
Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62
STAN. L. REV. 455, 480–513 (2010) (defending the patents-as-property argument), and Adam
Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321 (2009) (same).
38. See Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1692–95 (2013) (explaining
some of the difficulties in analogizing real and intellectual property); Deepa Varadarajan,
Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 660 (2014) (describing the historical
expansion of conceptions of property).
39. Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 41–42 (2012).
40. Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 518–
20 (2014).
41. Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 16–17), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2359873.
42. See Mossoff, supra note 38, 1688–89, 1692 (criticizing calls for “patent reform”); Liza
Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. REV. 501, 511
(2010) (discussing several patent reform proposals); Wasserman, supra note 8, at 1963–64
(reviewing PTO reform scholarship).
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growing area of patent litigation.
This Article’s proposal to administrate patent litigation proceeds as
follows. Part I catalogues and discerns the functions of administrative
agencies in patent litigation. Part II then describes some of the
difficulties that arise from these functions, and agencies’ exercise—or
failure to exercise—their attendant powers. Lastly, Part III provides
several solutions to these problems—currently available, politically
tenable, and cheaply deployed solutions—to produce a better
environment for patent litigation under a variety of administrative
regimes.
I.

THE FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN
PATENT LITIGATION

From the initial filing of a complaint to post-judgment review,
administrative agencies occupy a variety of functions in patent litigation.
In the earlier stages of litigation—indeed, in many instances, before
litigation even arises—administrative agencies serve as “litigation
gatekeepers,” authorities with “the power to oversee and manage private
litigation efforts” by limiting the types of patents or classes of claims in
dispute. 43 Agencies also participate in patent litigation itself by serving
as “experts”—either as scientific experts or expert legal authorities—in a
variety of capacities. And even after judgments are rendered in patent
disputes, some agencies exercise their power to review the propriety of a
judgment or settlement. Additionally, agencies may, throughout the
sequence of a typical patent case, serve as alternative or parallel venues
to traditional district court patent litigation. This Part explores each of
these functions in sequence.
A.

Litigation Gatekeeping

A long-overlooked function of administrative agencies, generally, is
their role as “litigation gatekeepers.” 44 In the words of David Freeman
Engstrom, “agency litigation gatekeeping” is:
the power to oversee and manage private litigation
efforts . . . [to] use their expertise and synoptic perspective to
weigh costs and benefits and determine whether private rights of
action should lie at all . . . [or] the power to evaluate private
lawsuits on a case-by-case basis, blocking bad cases, aiding
43. See Engstrom, supra note 13, at 619.
44. See id. at 621 (describing the gap in scholarship concerning this aspect of agency behavior);
Arthur F. Greenbaum, Government Participation in Private Litigation, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 853, 882–
983 (1989) (first identifying this function).
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good ones, and otherwise husbanding private enforcement
capacity in ways that conserve scarce public enforcement
resources for other uses. 45
This function of administrative agencies has been commonly ascribed
to agencies that oversee litigation with a strong public interest, such as
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s) review of
employment discrimination actions or the Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA’s) stewardship of citizen petitions. 46 Agency litigation
gatekeeping for purely private litigation—as patent litigation is
classically viewed 47—has been seemingly unexplored. But an
examination of agency administration of patent litigation demonstrates
that, in several critical respects, administrative agencies do “oversee and
manage private litigation efforts . . . and determine whether private
rights of action should lie at all.” 48 Invested with the power to police the
border between regulation and market exclusivity, 49 some agencies
directly limit which patents and claims can be sued on, when and by
whom, and whether concurrent district court proceedings should be
stayed pending the agencies’ own review of the patents in dispute.
The most salient example of this gatekeeping authority lies with the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Because the FDA is responsible
for authorizing newly developed drugs and medical devices, and because
patents play an essential role in the development process, 50 the FDA’s
regulatory powers are inextricably intertwined in patent disputes. 51
Notably, the FDA is entrusted with managing the “Orange Book,” a list
of which patents cover which FDA-approved drugs. 52 The Orange Book
plays a critical role in patent disputes between brand and generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers. As part of a New Drug Application, a
brand manufacturer must submit to the FDA, for inclusion in the Orange
Book, a list of which patents cover its proposed drug. 53 A generic
45. Engstrom, supra note 13, at 619–20.
46. See, e.g., id. at 646 tbl.2; Greenbaum, supra note 44, at 978–79.
47. See sources cited supra notes 39–41.
48. Engstrom, supra note 13, at 619.
49. See Heled, supra note 25, at 428–30 (describing the interaction between FDA exclusivity and
patent monopolies).
50. See id. at 426–28 (briefly reviewing the literature on this topic).
51. See id. at 428–30.
52. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012)
(“To facilitate the approval of generic drugs as soon as patents allow, the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments and FDA regulations direct brand manufacturers to file information about their
patents. . . . [The FDA] publishes the . . . corresponding patent numbers and expiration dates, in a
fat, brightly hued volume called the Orange Book (less colorfully but more officially denominated
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations).”).
53. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012) (“The applicant shall file with the application the patent number
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applicant, in turn, must certify to the FDA that its proposed generic
product does not infringe any of the listed patents. 54 Although the
generic applicant need not have “made, used, sold, or offered to sell” the
brand manufacturer’s drug—all potentially acts of patent
infringement 55—the generic application is, by statute, itself an artificial
act of patent infringement. 56 Accordingly, the FDA conditions its
approval for any generic drugs covered by patents listed in the Orange
Book on the final resolution of the resulting patent dispute between the
brand and generic manufacturers.57
As a practical matter, the FDA has long abdicated any substantive
authority over policing Orange Book listings, going so far as to denigrate
its own power as “purely ministerial.” 58 And scholars studying this
corner of patent law have mostly agreed: new drug applicants submit
patent information to the FDA; the FDA dutifully lists it in the Orange
Book without a glance. 59 But this descriptive view of the FDA’s
and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the
application or which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to which a claim of patent
infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.”).
54. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (requiring “a certification . . . that such patent is invalid or will not
be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is
submitted”).
55. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells
any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
56. Caraco Pharm., 132 S. Ct. at 1672 (“[A] so-called paragraph IV certification . . . is treated as
an act of infringement, giving the brand an immediate right to sue and resulting in a delay in the
generic drug’s approval.”).
57. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (allowing the approval of generic drugs covered by Orange Book
patents only if no action is brought for patent infringement within the forty-five-day statutory
period).
58. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The FDA defends this
purely ministerial conception of its role in the Orange Book listing process by explaining that it
lacks both the resources and the expertise to police the correctness of Orange Book listings.”); see
also Caraco Pharm., 132 S. Ct. at 1677 (mentioning the FDA’s perception of its role in Orange
Book listings, but declining to express a view on the matter).
59. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Antitrust Implications of Patent Settlements Involving Reverse
Payments: Defending a Rebuttable Presumption of Illegality in Light of Some Recent Scholarship,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1069, 1076 n.19 (2004) (“[N]ote only that the FDA does not attempt to verify
the Orange Book filings made by drug manufacturers, but rather plays a purely ministerial role.”);
Marina Lao, Reforming the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine, 55 RUTGERS L. REV.
965, 993–94 (2003) (“The FDA’s role in listing the patents in the Orange Book is purely ministerial;
it does not review the propriety of the patent listings.”); Jessie Cheng, Note, An Antitrust Analysis of
Product Hopping in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1507 (2008) (“The
FDA claims to play a purely ‘ministerial role’ and has shied away from actively intervening to
resolve issues related to competition—e.g., the scope of intellectual property rights and their
conferral of monopoly power, or the manipulation of the regulatory regime for anticompetitive
ends.”).
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authority—both potential and actually exercised—is incomplete. Despite
its insistence that it “lacks both the resources and the expertise to police
the correctness of Orange Book listings,” 60 the FDA has issued a number
of substantive regulations doing just that. Prior to August 2003, for
example, the FDA—for over fifteen years—authored and published
“patent use codes,” short interpretations of method-of-use claims for
Orange Book-listed patents. 61 Although applicants submit their own
patent use codes today, the FDA nonetheless engages in its own analysis
as to whether brand applicants’ use codes overlap with generic
manufacturers’ proposed method of use, wholly rejecting generic
applications that do so. 62 Lastly, the FDA’s current rule in 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.53 further prohibits “[p]rocess patents, patents claiming
packaging, patents claiming metabolites, and patents claiming
intermediates” from being listed in the Orange Book. 63
Contrary to common wisdom, these procedures strongly suggest that
the FDA’s authority with respect to policing Orange Book listings is far
from “purely ministerial.” It does, in fact, engage in limited attempts at
interpreting applicants’ patent information—having done so explicitly
for over a decade. And the agency limits which types of patents and
claims can and cannot be listed in the Orange Book, ultimately
conditioning its authority—regulatory approval of drug applications—on
patent construction. These Orange Book listings shape the very form of
patent litigation that takes place between brand and generic applicants:
they determine which patents can and cannot be sued upon, which
counterclaims can be permissibly brought, and what rights and
responsibilities each applicant possesses. 64 Although it is true that the
FDA exercises this power mechanically, and refuses to correct errors on
its own initiative, 65 these regulations are nonetheless a form of
administrative gatekeeping: they carry with them “the power to oversee
and manage private litigation efforts.” 66
60. aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 237.
61. Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug: Patent Submission and Listing
Requirements and Application of 30-Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug
Applications Certifying That a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed, 68 Fed.
Reg. 36676, 36683 (June 18, 2003) (“Traditionally, we have created the use code description for the
Orange Book from the information submitted by the NDA applicant or holder.”).
62. Caraco Pharm., 132 S. Ct. at 1677 (“Of particular relevance here, the FDA will not approve
such an [Abbreviated New Drug Application] if the generic’s proposed carve-out label overlaps at
all with the brand’s use code.”).
63. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2014).
64. Caraco Pharm., 132 S. Ct. at 1675.
65. See aaiPharma Inc., 296 F.3d at 237 (discussing the FDA’s refusal to correct Orange Booklisted patent information).
66. Engstrom, supra note 13, at 619.
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The FDA also acts as a litigation gatekeeper in its role in interim
patent term extensions, albeit indirectly. Under 35 U.S.C. § 156, a patent
covering a “product [that] has been subject to a regulatory review period
before its commercial marketing or use,” i.e., an FDA regulated drug or
device, may be extended for a portion of the period during which the
product was subject to FDA review. 67 The purpose of this section is “to
ameliorate the loss incurred when patent terms tick away while the
patented product is awaiting [the FDA’s] regulatory approval for
marketing.” 68 But to avoid giving patent holders additional protection
for drugs or devices for which they did not seek FDA approval, the
extension under § 156 is limited to the specific “product” and “use”
shepherded through regulatory approval. 69 What constitutes the specific
“product” and “use” for § 156’s purposes depends on how the FDA
crafts its approval letter, 70 making its approval letters—especially in a
contested area of technology—a form of indirect litigation gatekeeping.
In the recent dispute between Edwards Lifesciences AG and CoreValve,
Inc., for example, much of the litigation turned on the precise wording of
the FDA’s approval letter for CoreValve’s allegedly infringing device—
whether the approval covered only certain sizes of CoreValve’s device,
whether the approval was limited to “extreme risk patients,” and whether
the approval was conditioned on a “best outcomes” approach. 71
Other agencies also act as patent litigation gatekeepers, not by
rulemaking or overseeing private litigation itself, but by controlling the
timing and scope of district court patent litigation. Patented import
investigations before the ITC, for example, routinely affect parallel
district court litigation. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a), parties in parallel
proceedings before the ITC and federal district court may demand to
stay the district court proceedings until the ITC’s final determination; 72
“Congress has not authorized the ITC to stay its proceedings in favor of

67. 35 U.S.C. § 156(a)(4) (2012).
68. Unimed, Inc. v. Quigg, 888 F.2d 826, 829 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
69. 35 U.S.C. § 156(b)(1)(A); Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he restoration period of the patent does not extend to all products protected by the patent but
only to the product on which the extension was based.”).
70. See Merck & Co., 80 F.3d at 1547 (linking the “product” for § 156’s purposes to the FDA’s
approval letter).
71. Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., C.A. No. 08-91 (GMS), 2014 WL 1493187, at
*8–11 (D. Del. Apr. 15, 2014); Letter from Bram D. Zuckerman, M.D., Dir., Div. of
Cardiovascular, Devices Office of Device Evaluation, Center for Devices and Radiological Health,
to Mansi Gala, Principal Specialist, Regulatory Affairs, Medtronic CoreValve LLC (Jan. 17, 2014),
available at http://perma.cc/F6GL-U25L (approval order re P130021, Medtronic CoreValve System
(MCS)).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a) (2012).
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parallel district court proceedings.” 73 The mandatory district court stay
may, therefore, encourage (or dissuade) the parties to settle,74 or the
accused infringer to design around the asserted patents,75 in the
intervening time period. This makes the timing of the ITC’s proceedings,
for which Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) “normally have
unreviewable discretion,” 76 a potentially powerful lever to open—or
close—traditional district court litigation.77
In a similar vein, the PTO itself plays a role in patent litigation—not
merely patent prosecution—through its several “post-issuance
proceedings.” Today, the PTO may review the validity of a previously
issued patent in five distinct proceedings: reexamination, inter partes
review, post-grant review, covered business method review (also known
as “transitional [p]ost-grant [r]eview of . . . business methods”), and
supplemental examination. 78 In reexamination proceedings, for example,
“any person” may request that the PTO re-exam a patent if there exists a
“substantial new question of patentability,” 79 a determination that “rests
solely in the PTO’s discretion.” 80 Because the PTO engages in
reexaminations de novo, 81 and because reexamination proceedings tend
to be more adversarial in nature than original prosecutions, 82 re-exam
has become a potent weapon-of-choice for accused infringers seeking to
invalidate the asserted patents. 83 By some measures, accused infringers
facing district court litigation have requested patent reexaminations in
seventy-five percent of their cases. 84 They also frequently request that
73. Recasting, supra note 13, at 2353 (emphasis added).
74. See id. at 2348 (discussing how the length of the ITC stay may give rise to “attractive
settlement” offers, “undercut[ting] an alleged infringer’s incentive to stay in the fight to the finish”
(quoting Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating
Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 668 (2004))).
75. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 34–36 (discussing this in the context of stays of the
exclusion order).
76. Recasting, supra note 13, at 2344 n.51.
77. See id. at 2348 (discussing how the length of the ITC stay may give rise to “attractive
settlement” offers, “undercut[ting] an alleged infringer’s incentive to stay in the fight to the finish”)
(quoting Miller, supra note 74, at 668)).
78. See generally Andrei Iancu & Ben Haber, Post-Issuance Proceedings in the America Invents
Act, 93 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 476, 486 (2011).
79. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303 (2012).
80. Pieczenik v. Domantis, 120 F. App’x 317, 319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
81. See 35 U.S.C. § 305 (“[R]eexamination will be conducted according to the procedures
established for initial examination . . . .”).
82. See Stefan Blum, Note, Ex Parte Reexamination: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, 73 OHIO ST.
L.J. 395, 423–28 (2012) (discussing the adversarial nature of ex parte reexamination proceedings,
contrary to common wisdom that such proceedings are non-adversarial).
83. See generally Ben M. Davidson, Reexamining Reexaminations, 34 L.A. LAWYER 26 (2011).
84. Rogers, supra note 13, at 320 (citing Jack B. Blumenfeld & Leslie A. Polizoti, Stays Pending
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district courts stay the underlying litigation pending the PTO’s
reexamination proceedings, a procedure that works roughly fifty percent
of the time. 85 All in all, these numbers suggest that roughly thirty
percent of patent litigation is at some point stayed pending the PTO’s
reexamination procedure. 86
And yet, because the issue of whether, how, and to what extent a
reexamination is to proceed “rests solely in the PTO’s discretion,” 87 the
PTO plays an outsize role in determining the length and scope of the
stay, issues that may ultimately affect the ultimate resolution of the
underlying patent dispute. First, if the PTO grants a reexamination
request and cancels a patent’s claims, that decision is binding on the
district court, essentially removing the “case or controversy” required for
the court to have heard the infringement dispute in the first place. 88
Second, as with district court stays in section 337 89 proceedings before
the ITC, stays may encourage (or dissuade) the parties to settle or for the
accused infringer to design-around the asserted patent. 90 And lastly,
while reexaminations that fail to cancel any claims are not binding on
parallel litigation in the district courts, they may subtly and positively
alter how courts—and juries—view the asserted claims’ validity. 91 The
power that comes with the PTO’s assessment of patent reexamination,
therefore, grants the agency a de facto role in litigation gatekeeping,
using the agency’s “expertise and synoptic perspective to weigh costs
and benefits and determine whether private rights of action should lie at
all.” 92

Reexamination, 908 PLI/PAT 91, 97–98 (2007)).
85. Id.
86. The statistics presented by Blumenfeld & Polizoti, supra note 84, suggest that the PTO
receives a request for reexamination in seventy-five percent of all patent litigation; that litigants
request litigation stays in eighty percent of those requests; and that half of those requests—as
averaged, nationally—are ultimately granted. Taking these numbers as true, multiplying them
together (0.75 * 0.80 * 0.50) yields 0.30, or thirty percent. A fuller assessment would need to be
required to ascertain the true percentage.
87. Pieczenik v. Domantis, 120 F. App’x 317, 319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
88. Rogers, supra note 13, at 325 (“However, if the USPTO cancels a patent claim, then any
concurrent judicial proceeding must dismiss any claim based solely on patent rights conferred by
the now canceled claim.”).
89. For a discussion of Section 337 proceedings, see generally Kumar, supra note 21.
90. See sources cited supra notes 74–75.
91. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief, and
Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995, 1023–25 (2008) (reviewing the
literature of how patents subject to reexamination proceedings may experience fewer district court
invalidations).
92. Engstrom, supra note 13, at 619.
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B. Scientific and Technical Expertise
In several ways, administrative agencies also serve as scientific and
technical “experts” in patent litigation; entities that can—and do—
persuade federal courts by reason of their “knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education.” 93 This expertise comes in a variety of forms: as
public advocates in high-profile patent litigation; as advisors to
government litigants, such as the Office of the Solicitor General; and as
more generalized policymakers, issuing white papers and inter-agency
agreements upon which courts may rely.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), for example, has been heavily
involved as amici in several high-profile patent disputes. In Apple Inc. v.
Motorola, Inc. 94—part of the global “smartphone patent wars” featured
on the front pages of national newspapers 95—the FTC filed an amicus
brief in support of neither party on the competitive effects of preliminary
injunctions in patent disputes. 96 Of particular concern to the FTC was
the effect of Motorola’s request for injunctive relief, despite the fact that
Motorola had voluntarily joined a “standard-setting organization[]”
(SSO) with the promise that it would license its “standard-essential
patent[s]” on “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND)
terms. 97 The FTC’s concern with patent hold-up—using the threat of
injunctive relief as “a club to be wielded by a patentee to enhance his
negotiating stance” 98—ultimately guided the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit to the conclusion that Motorola was not entitled to an
injunction. 99 In doing so, the FTC relied on its “substantial experience
applying its competition policy expertise to the patent system to advance
the goals of enhancing consumer welfare and promoting innovation.” 100
Aside from its involvement in standard-essential patents litigation, the
FTC has also participated as expert amici in a variety of other patent
litigation contexts. In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 101
93. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 702.
94. 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
95. E.g., Andrea Chang & Jessica Guynn, Jury Sides with the iPhone-Maker in Its Lawsuit
Accusing Samsung of Patent Infringement, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2012, at AA1; Charles Duhigg &
Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at A1; Amir Efrati & Spencer
E. Ante, Google’s $12.5 Billion Gamble, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 2011, at A1.
96. Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission Supporting Neither Party, Apple Inc. v.
Motorola, Inc., 757 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Nos. 2012–1548, 2012–1549), 2012 WL 6655899.
97. Id. at 3–4.
98. Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Brief of
Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission, supra note 96, at 14.
99. Apple Inc., 757 F.3d at 1331–32.
100. Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission, supra note 96, at 1.
101. 405 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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the FTC employed its “significant expertise in the pharmaceutical
industry and the Hatch-Waxman Act” in interpreting a statutory
provision concerning the timing of a generic applicant’s request to bring
a declaratory judgment suit against a brand competitor if the brand
refused to sue the generic applicant. 102 Although the Federal Circuit
refused to hear the case en banc,103 Congress—shortly after the FTC’s
brief on the issue—amended the statutory provision in dispute in
accordance with the FTC’s argument. 104 In Ritz Camera & Image, LLC
v. SanDisk Corp., 105 the FTC similarly lent its expertise in antitrust law
to persuasively help the Federal Circuit trace the contours of Walker
Process claims—allegations that a patentee’s enforcement of its patent
rights constitute an “unlawful monopoly” if the patent was procured by
fraud. 106 And in TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 107 the FTC, in light of its
“substantial experience addressing restraints on competition involving
patents,” filed an amicus brief arguing for leniency in contempt where
the accused infringer had made a good faith attempt to “design around”
the asserted patent. 108 Although the FTC was not able to move a
majority of the Federal Circuit to its position in TiVo, its amicus brief
did bolster a spirited and lengthy dissent-in-part from five of the
judges. 109
It is important to note that the FTC’s assertiveness in private patent
disputes is relatively rare among administrative agencies. 110 Some of that
102. Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission Supporting Appellant’s Combined
Petition For Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 1, Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 405 F.3d
990 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1186), 2005 WL 4121866.
103. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 405 F.3d at 990–91.
104. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C) (2006); see also Ankur N. Patel, Comment, Delayed Access to
Generic Medicine: A Comment on the Hatch-Waxman Act and the “Approval Bottleneck,” 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1091–93 (2009) (discussing the history behind the change).
105. 700 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
106. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellee, Ritz Camera & Image, LLC v. SanDisk Corp., 700 F.3d 503 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (No. 121183), 2012 WL 2375063; see also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965).
107. 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
108. Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission on Rehearing En Banc Supporting
Neither Party at 1, TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Corp., 646 F.3d 869 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (No. 2009-1374),
2010 WL 3389919.
109. TiVo Inc., 646 F.3d at 891 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part) (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae
Federal Trade Commission, supra note 108, at 4–10).
110. Some isolated exceptions do exist. See, e.g., Covad Commc’n Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407
F.3d 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (concerning the Federal Communications Commission’s amicus in a
telecommunications patent dispute); SK & F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1067
(3d Cir. 1980) (discussing the FDA’s amicus concerning patents and generic competition, prior to
the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act); In re Brueckner, 623 F.2d 184, 186–87 (C.C.P.A. 1980)
(discussing the Department of Energy’s amicus brief concerning the unpatentability of atomic
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stems from the FTC’s independent statutory authority to “prosecute any
inquiry necessary to its duties.” 111 Some of that is due to a renewed
culture of assertive litigation within the agency. 112 And some is likely
because legal issues concerning the competitive effects of intellectual
property most naturally overlap with issues concerning “unfair methods
of competition.” 113 Other agencies, meanwhile, are generally cabined by
28 U.S.C. § 516, which reserves agencies’ litigation authority to the
Department of Justice (DOJ). 114
But administrative agencies do, nonetheless, serve as scientific and
technical experts in patent litigation in other ways. The National
Institutes of Health’s (NIH’s) involvement in Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 115—the “gene patenting” case—
serves as an excellent example. In Myriad, Myriad Genetics held several
patents encompassing the sequences of two human genes strongly
correlated with early-onset breast and ovarian cancer, BRCA1 and
BRCA2. 116 At issue before the Court was whether Myriad’s patents—and
other patents claiming the sequences of human genes—were ineligible
for patent protection as “products of nature,” or whether some exception
applied. 117 Deciding that issue was—and still is—fraught with scientific
and legal complexity. 118 But the Court’s decision was also one with
considerable government interest, one that implicated over thirty years
of patent practice before the PTO, over twenty years of NIH
involvement in “gene patent” policy, and over a decade of enforcing
several exclusive government licenses to similar technology. 119 In that
weapons).
111. 15 U.S.C. § 43 (2012); see also Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 625 (1935)
(“[T]he tribunal should be of high character and ‘independent of any department of the
government. . . . a board or commission of dignity, permanence, and ability, independent of
executive authority, except in its selection, and independent in character.’” (alteration in original)).
112. See generally Edward F. Cox, Reinvigorating the FTC: The Nader Report and the Rise of
Consumer Advocacy, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 899 (2005) (discussing this culture shift following the
release of the Nader Report in 1969).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
114. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in
which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the
Attorney General.”).
115. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
116. Id. at 2112.
117. Id. at 2111 (“This case involves claims from three of them and requires us to resolve
whether a naturally occurring segment of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is patent eligible under 35
U.S.C. § 101 by virtue of its isolation from the rest of the human genome.”).
118. See Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137,
1155–66 (2014) (discussing patent eligibility’s disharmony with natural complexity theory).
119. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
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vein, the NIH played an aggressive role in courting the DOJ’s Office of
the Solicitor General, “successfully convinc[ing] the Solicitor General to
reject the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s long-held, but only lightly
theorized, position of allowing claims on all ‘isolated’ DNA
molecules.” 120 It was the NIH’s position, channeled through the Solicitor
General, that ultimately won at the Supreme Court in Myriad. Today,
claims on isolated human genes are ineligible for patent protection,
while claims to synthetic transcripts of only the coding portions of those
genes remain patent eligible. 121
In other instances, administrative agencies deploy their expertise
through issuing white papers or reports on issues concerning patent
litigation. In recent years, the FTC has issued a number of influential
reports on patent litigation: Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent
Expiration: An FTC Study (2002), 122 To Promote Innovation: The
Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003), 123
and The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies
with Competition (2011). 124 Each has been cited by the Supreme Court,
and other federal courts, as an expert guide to especially thorny cases at
the intersection of private patent litigation and competition law. 125
1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring) (discussing the PTO’s history in granting patents
to “isolated DNA”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Rai, supra note 9, at 1249–56 (discussing the
NIH’s history in gene patent policy); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 6 n.2, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., __ U.S. __, 133 S.
Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 390999 (mentioning that “[i]n 1995, the government
granted an exclusive license under [four of the asserted] patents to respondent Myriad”).
120. Arti K. Rai, Biomedical Patents at the Supreme Court: A Path Forward, 66 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 111, 115 (2013), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/biomedical-patentssupreme-court-path-forward.
121. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2111 (“For the reasons that follow, we hold that a naturally occurring
DNA segment is a product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but
that cDNA is patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring.”).
122. FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY (2002), available at http://perma.cc/JNA3-3M48 [hereinafter FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY].
123. FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://perma.cc/4CYK-WAQF [hereinafter
FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION].
124. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION (2011), available at http://perma.cc/QH8N-96LB [hereinafter FTC,
EVOLVING IP].
125. E.g., Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014)
(quoting FTC, EVOLVING IP, supra note 124, to demonstrate “that [the] patent system fosters ‘an
incentive to be as vague and ambiguous as you can with your claims’ and ‘defer clarity at all
costs’”); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1678 (2012)
(citing FTC, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 122, as evidence that “some brands were exploiting
[the Hatch-Waxman Act] to prevent or delay the marketing of generic drugs”); Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 134 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal
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Similarly, the ITC routinely publishes snapshot reports of the patent
litigation it oversees, commenting on “non-practicing entities” (NPEs)—
also known as “patent trolls”—and “whether certain NPEs should be
permitted to obtain relief against infringing imports at the USITC.” 126
These, and similar reports, have served as important tools for patent
litigants seeking to restrict the ITC’s jurisdiction by narrowing its
“domestic industry” requirement. 127 And regarding the (heavily
patented) intersection between telecommunications and internet
protocols, 128 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has issued
an instrumental report on “E911” and “VOIP” technologies, 129 crucial to
several ongoing patent disputes. 130 This “soft expertise,” while not
necessarily deployed in the courtroom, has increasingly shaped a wide
variety of private patent disputes.
C. Post-Adjudicatory Review
With respect to patent litigation, several administrative agencies also
function as bodies of post-adjudicatory review: agencies that review the
merits and substance of traditional patent litigation for the purposes of
fulfilling their own mandates. And, like other agency functions in patent
litigation, those mandates vary: to fulfill an agency’s core function, as a
simple statutory constraint, or even to serve as a political check on yet
of writ of certiorari) (citing FTC, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION, supra note 123, as supporting an
industry-specific approach to distinguishing abstract concepts from patent eligible inventions).
126. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, FACTS AND TRENDS REGARDING USITC SECTION 337
INVESTIGATIONS 2 (Apr. 15, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/4YUC-AXEN [hereinafter ITC,
FACTS AND TRENDS].
127. E.g., Brief of Dell Inc. and Ford Motor Co. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition for a Writ
of Certiorari at 5–6, Nokia Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 469 (2013) (No. 121352), 2013 WL 2726788 (citing ITC, FACTS AND TRENDS, supra note 126, at 4).
128. See, e.g., Verizon Servs. Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp., 503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(VoIP patent litigation); 800 Adept, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 5:07CV23, 2008 WL
4831093 (E.D. Tex. July 23, 2008) (E911 patent litigation); TracBeam L.L.C. v. AT&T Inc., No.
6:11–CV–96, 2013 WL 6175372 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2013) (E911 patent litigation).
129. E911 concerns that technology that allows “wireless 911 callers [to] receive the same level
of emergency service as that available to wireline callers,” even though wireless callers have no
fixed location. See generally James M. Zagami et al., Providing Universal Location Services Using
a Wireless E911 Location Network, IEEE COMM. MAG., Apr. 1998, at 66. VOIP technology
concerns the real-time transmission of voice communication over the internet, i.e., “voice over IP.”
See Joe Hallock, A Brief History of VoIP (Nov. 26, 2004) (unpublished thesis for Masters of
Communication in Digital Media, University of Washington), available at http://perma.cc/EGW44FW6.
130. See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR NEXT
GENERATION 911 SERVICES 39 (Feb. 22, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/E8AL-8SLM
(“[I]ncreased emphasis on standards-based and outcome-oriented requirements, rather than specific
technologies, ‘can better prevent some of the intellectual property litigation issues that have arisen
in the E911 context from extending to NG911.’”).
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another agency’s authority.
Recently, the FTC has arguably played the most prominent role as a
body of post-adjudicatory review of patent litigation. In particular, the
FTC has been heavily involved in “reverse payment” or “pay-to-delay”
settlements in the pharmaceutical context.131 Under the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the FDA may not approve an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA), i.e., an application for a generic version of a brand drug, as
long as the brand drug is covered by any valid, unexpired patents. 132 To
gain entry to the brand drugs’ market, generics typically challenge the
brand drugs’ patents through traditional patent litigation.133 Where a
brand’s patents are weak, or where a generic’s challenge appears that it
will ultimately be successful, a brand pharmaceutical manufacturer has
strong incentives to settle any patent litigation. Otherwise, the brand
manufacturer risks a judgment that its patents are invalid or
unenforceable or that a generic product would not infringe the patents in
the first instance. 134 Brand manufacturers’ drive to settle has frequently
led to agreements to delay the generic’s entry to the market in exchange
for ancillary licenses, cash payments, and other compensation paid to the
generic manufacturer. 135 This arrangement is somewhat peculiar
because, typically, it is the accused infringer who pays the patent
holder—not the other way around. 136 But, in the words of Michael A.
Carrier, such agreements occur “because of the parties’ aligned
incentives. By delaying generic entry, the brand firm can increase its
monopoly profits. It can then use a portion of those profits to pay the
generic more than it would have received by entering the market.” 137
Suffice it to say, such agreements to “pay to delay” market entry raise
131. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227–28 (2013)
(discussing the FTC’s review of “reverse payment” or “pay-to-delay” patent settlements).
132. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
133. See id. (setting forth the procedure for initiating such a suit); ADAM GREENE & D. DEWEY
STEADMAN, RBC CAPITAL MARKETS, PHARMACEUTICALS: ANALYZING LITIGATION SUCCESS
RATES, RBC CAP. MARKETS 3 (Jan. 15, 2010), available at http://perma.cc/E57L-JX2H (finding
that, for 2009, generic competitors filed sixty-five “first-to-file” challenges to brand pharmaceutical
patents).
134. See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1580–88 (2006) (discussing the incentives of settlement).
135. See David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in
Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1308 (2010) (“[M]ost of these settlements
address the following four fundamental points: (1) amount of reverse payment; (2) length of generic
marketing restriction; (3) retention of generic market exclusivity; and (4) ancillary licenses.”).
136. See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227 (“Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the
alleged infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called
a ‘reverse payment’ settlement agreement.”).
137. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive
Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 39–40 (2009).
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traditional antitrust concerns. 138 And the FTC has been especially
vigilant about policing them, instituting numerous antitrust
investigations against brand and generic manufacturers alike. 139 It is
those investigations that frequently function as fora for mid- to postadjudicatory review of underlying patent litigation. In their antitrust
complaints against settling pharmaceutical competitors, the FTC has
routinely required parties to re-engage in analyses as to the strength of
the underlying patents, 140 their exclusionary scope, 141 and the
reasonableness of the parties’ arguments in the initial patent litigation
proceeding. 142 In Federal Trade Commission v. Watson, 143 for example,
the “lynchpin” of the FTC’s original antitrust complaint against the
brand manufacturer was that the brand manufacturer “probably would
have lost the underlying patent infringement action—that is, [the generic
challengers] had a strong case that the [asserted] patent did not bar their
entry into the generic [product’s] market.” 144 To prove its case, the FTC
sought to relitigate, in district court, the strength of the asserted patent’s
validity, the extent of its scope, and the reasonableness of the parties’
validity and infringement arguments. 145
Although the Supreme Court has since attempted to cabin these sorts
of inquiries in the FTC’s review of reverse payment settlements,146 they
are not gone entirely, and pharmaceutical manufacturers facing FTC
scrutiny of their patent settlements may, in fact, wish to raise patent
validity arguments in their defense. 147 But in any event, it is likely that
138. See, e.g., Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227.
139. See id. at 2227–28; see generally James C. Burling, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements: The
Battle For A Benchmark, 20 ANTITRUST 41 (2006) (discussing the early history of the FTC’s
interest in reverse payment settlements).
140. See Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 402 F.3d 1056, 1061 (11th Cir. 2005)
(recounting the FTC’s arguments that the underlying patents, despite the settlement between the
brand and generic manufacturers, were invalid).
141. See id. at 1066 (discussing the importance of “the exclusionary potential of the patent”).
142. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1311 n.8 (11th Cir. 2012)
(discussing, but rejecting, the weight FTC’s investigations placed on “the strength of the patent
holder’s claims of validity and infringement, as objectively viewed at the time of settlement”), rev’d
and remanded sub nom. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1305.
145. In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1376–79 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
146. See Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2234 (“[A]ntitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment agreement
would require the parties to litigate the validity of the patent in order to demonstrate what would
have happened to competition in the absence of the settlement. Any such litigation will prove time
consuming, complex, and expensive. The antitrust game . . . [may] not be worth that litigation
candle.”); Edlin et al., supra note 20, at 19 (“The Court makes clear that litigating the patent is not
necessary for the affirmative antitrust case.”).
147. See Comment, Hatch-Waxman Act—Reverse-Payment Settlements—FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,
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the FTC will continue to assess such issues in its initial internal
investigations. Much as large, pay-to-delay settlements on weak
intellectual property harm consumers, brand-generic “early entry”
settlements on strong, pioneering drug patents do little competitive
harm, whether a reverse payment is involved or otherwise. Similarly,
sheltering narrowly construed patents from forced litigation raises less
anticompetitive concerns, generally, than doing the same for broadly
claimed patents. 148 Determining which is the case nonetheless places the
FTC as a body of post-adjudicatory review of the merits of an original
patent suit.
To a lesser extent, the FDA also engages in a type of postadjudicatory patent litigation analysis. The statute concerning the FDA’s
approval of patent-threatening generic products conditions that approval
on a federal court judgment as to the patent’s invalidity or the proposed
product’s noninfringement. 149 But patents routinely consist of multiple,
independent claims, some of which may be valid and some of which
may not. 150 And, even a judgment of patent infringement against a
proposed generic product may focus on only one particular dosage or
method of use out of many proposed by the generic manufacturer. 151
Thus, in the case of a mixed judgment, the FDA may need to serve as a
reviewing panel of the underlying patent litigation, determining which
claims of a multiple-claim patent remain valid; which claims, if any, the
generic manufacturer infringes; and which specific form of the proposed
generic product infringes, or does not infringe, the listed patent.
This was precisely the role played by the FDA in Pfizer, Inc. v.
Apotex, Inc. 152 In Pfizer, Apotex, a generic manufacturer, unsuccessfully
challenged the patent covering Pfizer’s Norvasc product for treating
hypertension and heart pain. 153 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court and declared three of the patent’s eleven claims invalid
127 HARV. L. REV. 358, 367 (2013) (“[P]harmaceutical developers’ best defense against these
antitrust challenges will be establishing the validity of the patent . . . .”).
148. See Hemphill, supra note 134, at 1606–07 (discussing the difference in competitive effects
between the intellectual property at issue in narrow versus broad cases).
149. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012).
150. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent,
or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims;
dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an
invalid claim.”).
151. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2003) (reviewing the
patent litigation between Hoescht Marion Roussel, the brand, and Andrx Pharmaceuticals, the
generic, concerning Andrx’s design-around Hoescht’s Orange Book-listed formulation patent
covering dissolution profiles).
152. 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
153. Id. at 1352.
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for obviousness. 154 But while the FDA then approved Apotex’s generic
product, it denied a host of follow-on generic applications on the
grounds that “the Federal Circuit’s ruling invalidated only certain
portions of the Norvasc patent, [such that] Pfizer’s patent remains valid
as to any remaining claims.” 155 This had the effect, under the FDA’s
reading of the operative statute, of demanding that “no generic
manufacturers except for Apotex [could] benefit from the Federal
Circuit’s [mixed] ruling.” 156 A later lawsuit filed by the later-generic
applicants against the FDA directly was unsuccessful. 157 Thus, despite
the FDA’s disclaimer of possessing expertise in patent law, 158 Pfizer and
the agency’s own interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act required it, in
some sense, to sit as a body of post-adjudicatory review; to determine
which claims of Pfizer’s patent were still valid and which the follow-on
generics’ proposed products putatively infringed.
Not all agency review of patent litigation arises from judgments in
federal court. In an interesting variation on the post-adjudicatory review
function, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
has final say over any judgments arising from section 337 patented
import proceedings before the ITC. 159 Because the ITC serves as an
alternative venue for patent disputes, patented import litigation before
the ITC focuses on the same core issues of invalidity and infringement
as does traditional patent litigation in district courts, with its judgments
reflecting similar, if not identical, analyses. 160 If the ITC does find a
violation of section 337, i.e., it concludes that the asserted patents were
valid and infringed, it must wait sixty days before effectuating any
judgment against the respondent. 161 During that sixty-day time period,
the ITC must transmit its decision to the USTR, which is entitled to
disapprove of the ITC’s proposed order. 162
Although the statute suggests that any grounds for disapproving the
ITC’s findings are limited to “policy reasons,” 163 there is little
154. Id. at 1372.
155. Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Leavitt, 484 F. Supp. 2d 109, 121 (D.D.C. 2007).
156. Id. at 118.
157. See id.
158. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
159. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2) (2012) (investing the President with the power to nullify the
ITC’s findings of infringement under § 337); Presidential Documents, Memoranda of President,
Assignment of Certain Functions Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 70 Fed. Reg. 43251
(July 21, 2005) (delegating the President’s authority under § 337 to the USTR).
160. See infra notes 169–181 and accompanying text.
161. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2).
162. Id.
163. Id.
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preventing the USTR from expanding this authority by couching a
substantive review of the ITC’s proposed order as a matter of economic
“policy.” In 1987, for example, the USTR disapproved of a proposed
ITC order concerning DRAM chips, which “require[d] all importers of
computers, facsimile machines, telecommunications switching
equipment, and printers that contain DRAMs to determine the type and
source of DRAMs contained in their machines and certify this for each
import of these products.” 164 This, the USTR believed, would have
“extend[ed] far beyond [the respondent] and importers of [the
respondent’s] infringing products . . . [as] there [wa]s no evidence of
imports of [the accused products] manufactured by [the respondent]
contained in the categories of machines covered in the order.” 165 Even
though it was without statutory authority to do so, the USTR then
proposed that the ITC narrow its order to three categories of products
containing DRAMs that it believed captured the infringing market. 166
While a recent section 337 disapproval has seemingly abdicated any
authority to “revisit the [ITC’s] legal analysis or its findings based on its
record,” 167 historical practice suggests that the scope of such authority is
likely to change from presidential administration to presidential
administration. 168
D. Alternative Fora
Lastly, administrative agencies can also function as alternative fora
for patent litigation. The ITC and the PTO both employ procedures that,
like district court litigation, allow accused infringers or business rivals to
challenge core issues of patent validity and infringement. Here, patented
import proceedings before the ITC serve as the clearest example. Under
section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1337), the
ITC has the power to enjoin “[t]he importation into the United
States . . . of articles that . . . infringe a valid and enforceable United
164. Presidential Disapproval of a Section 337 Determination, 52 Fed. Reg. 46011, 46012 (Dec.
3, 1987).
165. Id.
166. Id. (proposing that the ITC limit its proposed order to certain DRAMs manufactured by the
respondent; DRAMs incorporated in certain carriers, circuit boards, or memory expansion boards;
and any products manufactured by the respondent that contained DRAMs).
167. Letter from Michael B.G. Froman, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Representative, to Irving A.
Williamson, Chairman, Int’l Trade Comm’n, at 3 (Aug. 3, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/
B4H3-HF8E.
168. See Tony V. Pezzano & Jeffrey M. Telep, Latest Developments on Injunctive Relief for
Infringement of FRAND-Encumbered SEPs—Part I, 26 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 25 (2014)
(recounting the historical practice of Section 337 disapprovals and suggesting that four of the
previous five disapprovals all occurred during the Reagan administration).
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States patent or . . . are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or
by means of, a process covered by the claims of a valid and enforceable
United States patent.” 169 Procedurally, aggrieved patent holders file a
complaint with the ITC, which must then determine whether the
complaint is sufficient and whether the “public interest” merits
investigation. 170 If so, the complainant and the respondent then engage in
what appears, by all accounts, to look like traditional federal litigation:
the respondent files a response to the complainant’s charges; 171 the
parties engage in an early Rule 16-like scheduling conference; 172
discovery—including depositions, interrogatories, and requests for
production and admission—commences; 173 the parties file motions to
dismiss the complaint or for early judgment; 174 they narrow their claims
at a pre-hearing conference; 175 and ultimately, an adjudicator—here, an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)—conducts an evidentiary hearing. 176
Notably, many of the ITC’s own regulations for section 337 proceedings
expressly incorporate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 177 and give
the agency “nationwide jurisdiction to conduct investigations, including
nationwide service of process for subpoena enforcement actions.” 178
And, with respect to patent litigation specifically, the “parties may raise
any equitable or legal defense [under the patent statute], such as patent
invalidity.” 179 To be sure, there are differences between federal patent
169. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B) (2012).
170. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.10 (2014).
171. Compare id. § 210.13 (providing for a response to a complaint), with FED. R. CIV. P.
12(a)(1)(A) (providing for an answer in response to a complaint).
172. Compare U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, PUB. NO. 4105, ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 19 (Mar. 2009), available at http://perma.cc/E7XE-PU3V (“The dates of such hearings
are usually set forth in a procedural schedule issued by the Judge early in the investigation, and if a
hearing is rescheduled, the Judge will normally issue an order with the new dates.”), with FED. R.
CIV. P. 16 (providing for setting a schedule, “establishing early and continuing control so that the
case will not be protracted because of lack of management”).
173. Compare 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.27–210.31 (providing for discovery), with FED. R. CIV. P. 30–36
(providing for the same).
174. Compare 19 C.F.R. § 210.15 (governing motions), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12, 56 (governing
the same).
175. Compare 19 C.F.R. § 210.35 (providing for a pre-hearing conference), with FED. R. CIV. P.
16 (providing for a pretrial conference).
176. Compare 19 C.F.R. § 210.42 (providing for an Administrative Law Judge to issue an “initial
determination” as to infringement and validity), with FED. R. CIV. P. 39 (providing for a trial by a
judge or by a jury, depending on the circumstances).
177. See, e.g., 19 C.F.R. § 210.33 (incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) regarding
sanctions); id. § 210.70 (incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 regarding the forfeiture
of bonds); id. § 210.27 (incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g) regarding attorneys’
fees).
178. Kumar, supra note 21, at 535.
179. Id. However, Kumar notes “that the ITC has held that defenses under 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) are
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litigation and section 337 disputes—such as an accelerated timetable and
the inclusion of a neutral-party staff attorney representing the public
interest 180—but litigators well-versed in district court patent litigation
will find familiar comfort in these analogous proceedings before the
ITC. 181 Indeed, “the ITC is busier with patent cases than it has ever been
before.” 182 Since the Supreme Court limited the availability of
permanent injunctions in patent disputes in 2006, 183 the number of
section 337 ITC filings appears to have tripled from 2006–2010, 184
making it a viable alternative forum to district court patent litigation.185
Interestingly, several administrative procedures available at the PTO
also appear to serve as an alternative patent litigation venue. In these
“post-issuance proceedings,” accused infringers or business rivals may,
in some circumstances, challenge the validity of previously issued
patents much as they would in district court litigation.186 Under the
recently modified “inter partes review,” any person other than the patent
holder—including defendants to ongoing patent litigation—may request
that the PTO review an issued patent for invalidity if any printed
materials raise a “reasonable likelihood” that the patent is, in fact,
invalid. 187 Similarly, under “post-grant review,” any person other than
the patent holder may ask the PTO to declare a patent invalid for any
reason. 188 In addition, Congress has instituted a transitional program of
post-grant review for certain financial business method patents, also
known as “covered business method” (CBM) review. 189 Under CBM
review, a defendant threatened for infringing a covered business method
not available in § 337 proceedings.” Id. n.29.
180. Id. at 537 (describing the typical section 337 timetable—seventeen months from complaint
to Initial Determination—as “faster then [sic] some so-called ‘rocket docket’ district courts”); id. at
534 (“A staff attorney is assigned to each investigation to represent the public interest and acts as a
third-party litigant.”); see also Bock, supra note 14, at 250–52 (describing the effects of the staff
attorney); infra Part 2 (discussing estoppel in this context).
181. See Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 231 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Lourie, J.,
dissenting) (“Everyone familiar with patent litigation knows that ITC proceedings are considered
‘litigation.’”).
182. Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 3.
183. See id. at 8–19 (discussing the effect of eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388
(2006)).
184. See ITC, FACTS AND TRENDS, supra note 126, at 1.
185. Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 2 (“In the past five years, both PAEs and productproducing companies have flocked to this once-obscure trade agency in search of injunctions or the
credible threat of injunctions.”).
186. Iancu & Haber, supra note 78, at 476.
187. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2012) (governing inter partes review); id. § 314 (setting forth the
“reasonable likelihood” threshold for the commencement of inter partes review).
188. Id. § 321 (governing post-grant review).
189. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011).
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patent—by regulation, “a patent that claims a method or corresponding
apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the
practice, administration, or management of a financial product or
service” 190—may institute a CBM review before the PTO to challenge
the patent’s validity on any grounds. 191
Each of these post-issuance proceedings is procedurally “trial like.” 192
The challenger files a petition; 193 the patent owner files a response; 194
the parties engage in routine discovery 195 and filings analogous to
motions practice; 196 a hearing before a fact-finder is held; 197 and the factfinder issues a written decision. 198 Like litigators’ familiarity with ITC
practice, these post-issuance proceedings have made the PTO—an
agency much better known for examining patents than for litigating
them—“viable as an alternative to district court litigation, for both
patentees and potential infringement defendants with patent validity
questions.” 199
II.

PROBLEMS WITH AGENCY ADMINISTRATION OF
PATENT LITIGATION

The diversity of agency functions in patent litigation highlights one of
the classic problems in administrative law: that an increase in the
amount and extent of agency involvement in shared regulatory space
creates the potential to “produce redundancy, inefficiency, and gaps,
[and] more than anything else, . . . create profound coordination
challenges.” 200 Although the problems of agency administration of
190. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (2014).
191. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18.
192. See Iancu & Haber, supra note 78, at 479.
193. 35 U.S.C. § 312 (governing petitions for inter partes review); id. § 322 (governing petitions
for post-grant review).
194. Id. § 313 (governing responses to petitions for inter partes review); id. § 323 (governing
responses to petitions for post-grant review).
195. Id. § 316(a)(5) (permitting the Director to issue regulations concerning discovery in inter
partes review); id. § 326(a)(5) (permitting the Director to issue regulations concerning discovery in
post-grant review).
196. Id. § 316(d)(2) (allowing for limited motions practice in inter partes review); id. § 326(d)(2)
(allowing for limited motions practice in post-grant review).
197. Id. § 316(a)(10) (permitting oral hearings in inter partes review); id. § 326(a)(10) (permitting
oral hearings in post-grant review).
198. Id. § 318 (requiring a written decision in inter partes proceedings); id. § 328 (requiring a
written decision in post-grant proceedings).
199. See Iancu & Haber, supra note 78, at 476.
200. Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1131, 1135 (2012).
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patent litigation differ little from traditional regulatory problems, they
abound. The high-stakes nature of many patent disputes make them
particularly susceptible to regulatory gamesmanship. High-profile patent
litigation among frequently litigious or politically significant industries
also causes agencies to suffer from both industry and political capture.
The regulatory nature of agency involvement in disputes makes
settlement, in some instances, uncertain. And, where regulatory
decisions affect parties’ core claims of infringement or validity, litigants
face the prospect of inconsistent judgments. This Part explains the
difficulties with agency administration of patent litigation across
agencies’ various functions.
A. Regulatory Gamesmanship
One of the more profound problems with agency administration of
patent litigation is, in the words of Stacey L. Dogan and Mark A.
Lemley, “regulatory gamesmanship”: “private behavior that harnesses
procompetitive or neutral regulations and uses them for exclusionary
purposes.” 201 Generally, regulatory gamesmanship “undermines both the
regulatory system itself and the long-standing, complementary
relationship between regulatory and antitrust law.” 202 In the patent
context, the exclusionary advantages generated by regulatory gaming
often extend well beyond the scope of the patent at issue. 203 And within
the crucible of litigation itself, regulatory gamesmanship generates
tremendous inefficiencies, diverts courts’ focus from core issues of
infringement and invalidity, and causes often lengthy delays in the
timely resolution of complaints. 204
Commentators have written about these issues at length by focusing
on a single industry: pharmaceutical manufacturers. 205 In particular,
commentators have complained that brand manufacturers’ strategy of
“product hopping”—making medically insignificant alterations to
previously approved, patented drugs in the hopes of forestalling generic
competition—is a form of regulatory gamesmanship. 206 But viewed from
a broader, functional perspective, regulatory gamesmanship seems to
201. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 687.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 709–17 (discussing this phenomenon in the pharmaceutical context).
204. See id. at 712–13 (discussing this aspect of delay in Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
432 F. Supp. 2d 408 (D. Del. 2006)).
205. E.g., Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1016–17 (2010); Cheng, supra note
59, at 1486–89; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 709–17.
206. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 709–17.
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occur on both the front and back ends of patent litigation: at the
beginning, where agencies serve as litigation gatekeepers, and at the end,
where agencies act as alternative venues to patent litigation.
Regarding litigation gatekeeping, it is true that the FDA’s own
regulations, in some sense, promote regulatory gamesmanship.207 The
phenomenon of product hopping occurs because the FDA’s own
interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act requires it to disapprove a
generic’s ANDA if the proposed drug does not match the precise
specifications listed by the brand—the “reference listed drug” (RLD)—
as opposed to a looser definition of the brand’s pharmaceutical
product. 208 In one of the more egregious cases of product hopping,
Purdue Pharma, with its patents on its blockbuster drug OxyContin set to
expire, changed the pharmaceutical formulation of the drug in order to
prevent the entry of generic competitors. 209 Purdue did so by simply
changing the drug’s tablet shell to be more resistant to abuse. 210 And,
once Purdue received FDA approval for its “abuse-proofed” formulation
of OxyContin, it successfully filed a citizen petition—essentially, against
itself—to remove as “unsafe” OxyContin’s previous RLD from the
FDA’s rolls, 211 leaving generic competitors with no RLD to copy.
This banal strategy 212 highlights how regulatory gamesmanship fits
within a concept of agency function in patent litigation. Product hopping
serves to harness the FDA’s neutral regulations concerning RLDs by
using them to exclude generic competitors prior to the commencement
of patent litigation—i.e., by preying on the FDA’s role as a gatekeeper
of patent litigation. By shuttling a defined, pharmaceutical product’s
RLD from one form to another, and by removing old RLDs from the
FDA’s rolls, a brand manufacturer can prevent generic competitors from
challenging the brand’s patents through traditional litigation. In that
sense, what product hopping accomplishes is to divest the FDA of “the
power to oversee and manage private [patent] litigation efforts.” 213 The
207. See id. at 687 (“Indeed—and perhaps ironically—the very regulatory structure that exists to
promote competition can create gaming opportunities for competitors bent on achieving
anticompetitive goals.”).
208. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.127 (2014) (requiring the denial of an ANDA if the application does not
precisely parallel the brand’s reference listed drug).
209. For a recounting of the OxyContin patent litigation and antitrust saga, see Purdue Pharma
L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and, more recently, In re
OxyContin Antitrust Litig., No. 04 Md. 1603(SHS), 2014 WL 2198590 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2014).
210. In re OxyContin, 2014 WL 2198590, at *1.
211. Letter from Peter R. Mathers, Counsel to Purdue Pharma L.P., to Food & Drug Admin. (July
13, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/XTY5-ARFV.
212. See Cheng, supra note 59, at 1489–94 (describing AstraZeneca’s, Abbott’s, and Fournier’s
product hopping).
213. See Engstrom, supra note 13, at 619.
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availability of citizen petitions similarly accomplishes this goal.
Petitions that force the FDA to remove a product’s RLD work in much
the same fashion as product hopping: without an RLD on which to base
an ANDA, generic competitors cannot, through the Hatch-Waxman
framework, litigate a brand’s patents. But, because the FDA must
respond to all citizen petitions it receives,214 citizen petitions also
frequently serve to delay the FDA’s consideration of a generic’s ANDA
and, consequently, any resulting patent litigation. 215 Like the ITC’s and
PTO’s role in controlling the timing of district court litigation, 216 citizen
petitions require the FDA to delay its considerations of generics’
ANDAs, barring the gate, in some cases, to patent litigation in the first
instance. 217
Not all regulatory gamesmanship occurs to bar the initiation of patent
litigation, however. Regulatory gamesmanship before the ITC and PTO
serves to drag out patent litigation once it has already begun, clogging—
as opposed to stopping—those agencies’ functions as gatekeepers. In the
case of the ITC, a party unsatisfied with the pace (or interim results) of
district court patent litigation may file a contemporaneous section 337
complaint before the ITC. 218 Because of the mandatory stay imposed
upon district courts in parallel proceedings, 219 the ITC complaint has the
effect of essentially grinding the district court litigation to a seventeenmonth halt. 220 In this way, a litigant can take advantage of the
“procompetitive or neutral regulations” regarding the ITC’s availability

214. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F) (2012) (requiring the FDA to respond to petitions “not later than
150 days after the date on which the petition is submitted”).
215. See Ryan Abbott, Big Data and Pharmacovigilance: Using Health Information Exchanges
to Revolutionize Drug Safety, 99 IOWA L. REV. 225, 263 (2013) (“Brand companies have significant
incentives to file to delay generic competition. Their filing may delay ANDA approval even if their
petition is not granted. In addition, it is inexpensive to file, and there are no consequences for filing
frivolous petitions. Brand firms use these petitions as part of a comprehensive strategy, which also
includes reverse-payment patent settlements and ‘product hopping,’ to delay generics’ entry into the
market.”); Carrier & Wander, supra note 1616, at 288 (demonstrating, empirically, that citizen
petitions have “played a pivotal role in delaying generic entry”).
216. See supra notes 72–92 and accompanying text.
217. See Matthew Avery et al., The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” Citizen Petitions
with the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 135–37 (2013) (discussing the litigation delays caused by the
brand’s citizen petitions in the Flonase case).
218. See Colleen v. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at the
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 70 (2008) (“65 percent of the ITC
cases studied had a district court counterpart, which indicates that the ITC is often not the venue of
only resort as it was originally conceived to be.” (emphasis in original)).
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a); see also supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
220. See Kumar, supra note 21, at 537 (describing the typical section 337 case before the ITC as
lasting seventeen months).
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and district court stays, and “use[ ] them for exclusionary purposes.” 221
Post-issuance proceedings before the PTO work in a similar vein. In
inter partes review, defendants in a patent infringement action may
petition the PTO for review up to one year after being served with the
patent holder’s complaint. 222 Once a request for inter partes review is
filed, the district court proceedings are automatically stayed pending the
outcome of review. 223 Given that the average patent infringement suit is
typically resolved within a year, 224 (significantly longer for HatchWaxman litigation) 225 inter partes review’s one-year buffer essentially
allows infringement defendants to test the waters of district court
litigation—from answer, to both fact and expert discovery, to motions to
dismiss and potentially for summary judgment—before halting the
infringement suit against them. Later, inter partes review filings serve
little purpose other than to control the PTO’s power as a gatekeeper to
district court litigation.
The same strategy also applies to post-grant review proceedings.
Although there is no time limit on filing a request for post-grant review
based on the timing of a civil complaint, parties must file their requests
within nine months after the patent’s issuance. 226 Thus, because the vast
majority of patent litigation occurs on older patents, 227 defendants bent
on waiting until litigation against them has largely progressed will have
little difficulty doing so.
Lastly, the procedures for CBM review seem to acknowledge the role
that post-issuance proceedings play in hampering district court litigation.
There, CBM review is not available unless a party has been sued for
patent infringement. 228 Here, the express purpose—by Congressional
design—seems solely to allow defendants to delay contemporaneous
district court litigation.229 In that sense, litigants using the neutral
221. Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 687.
222. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299 (2011).
223. Id.
224. See Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 415 (2010)
(noting that the typical patent case is resolved in about a year).
225. S. Peter Ludwig et al., Hatch-Waxman in the Federal Courts: From 1994–2004, 31 DRUG
DEV. & INDUS. PHARMACY 215, 221 (2005) (assessing typical Hatch-Waxman proceedings as
lasting twenty-nine months to resolution).
226. 35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (2012).
227. Dennis Crouch, Age of Patents When Asserted, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 31, 2012),
http://perma.cc/S2L-FGMX (showing that the bulk of patents are first asserted well after they are a
year old).
228. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 18(a), 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011).
229. See Carter, supra note 19, at 2 (“The Section 18 language to swat away pesky businessmethod patents—for banks—was dropped into the Senate version of the bill by prolific Wall Street
fundraiser and third-ranking Democratic Sen. Chuck Schumer (N.Y.) . . . . ‘This [is] the sort of gift
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procedural rules governing post-issuance proceedings have harnessed
the PTO’s power to “determine whether private rights of action should
lie at all.” 230
B. Industry Capture
Agency administration of patent litigation, like regulation elsewhere,
also suffers from the potential for industry capture, “the co-opting of
regulatory agencies by [industry] groups, to the extent that the institution
promotes the particular private interest of those groups rather than the
overall public good.” 231 Where agency involvement in patent litigation
has the potential to ensure an IP-sensitive industry the continued vitality
of its patent monopolies, or where litigation by upstart patent holders
threatens to shutter established, accused infringers, industry groups will
attempt to navigate agencies in patent litigation toward their own
ends. 232 Although the normative effects of industry capture in patent
litigation are difficult to generalize—it is unclear whether the outcome in
any individual patent dispute will contribute or detract from the “overall
public good”—industry capture short-circuits the important role that
private patent litigation plays in innovation policy. It undermines the
foundation of the patent grant by troubling exclusive rights to valid
patents, 233 and it weakens the public utility of using litigation to weed
out invalid patents. 234
Industry capture of agency administration of patent litigation appears
to occur across a broad spectrum of agency functions, from agencies’
initial role as gatekeepers, through their prominence in post-adjudicatory
review, and, finally, as alternative fora of litigation itself. The recently
implemented Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act stands
to major corporations that is the hallmark of bad legislation,’ says Tom Giovanetti, president of the
Institute for Policy Innovation . . . . ‘This is a case of the banks using their raw political clout.’”).
230. See Engstrom, supra note 13, at 619.
231. K. Sabeel Rahman, Note, Envisioning the Regulatory State: Technocracy, Democracy, and
Institutional Experimentation in the 2010 Financial Reform and Oil Spill Statutes, 48 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 555, 555 (2011).
232. See George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. SCI. 3, 5
(1971) (“[E]very industry or occupation that has enough political power to utilize the state will seek
to control entry.”).
233. See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Technology,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537, 537 (2005) (“Copyright and similar exclusive rights regimes have long
been mainstays of innovation policy, purporting to provide the incentive necessary to generate
creative and innovative products for the benefit of the public.”).
234. Blonder-Tongue Lab. Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 n.21 (1971) (“Patent
validity raises issues significant to the public as well as to the named parties. . . . It is just as
important that a good patent be ultimately upheld as that a bad one be definitively stricken.”
(quoting Technograph Printed Circuits v. United States, 372 F.2d 969, 977 (Fed. Cl. 1967))).
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testament to the powers of industry capture on agencies’ role in litigation
gatekeeping. 235 Prior to the GAIN Act, new drugs approved by the FDA
received anywhere from four to seven-and-a-half years of market
exclusivity—with or without a patent—during which the FDA was
prohibited from approving any follow-on generics.236 This prohibition
on generic approval serves as a lock-keeper for litigation: during the
period of market exclusivity, generics have no easy path into court to
challenge the brand’s patents; after market exclusivity expires, the
floodgates of litigation open. 237 Faced with decreasing profitability in
manufacturing antibiotics, increasing patent uncertainty, and a public
health crisis regarding antibiotic overuse, 238 antibiotic manufacturers
were able to successfully lobby Congress to include, as part of the Food
and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, an additional
market exclusivity category for “qualified infectious disease products”
(QIPDs), i.e., antibiotics. 239 Thanks to the GAIN Act, QIPDs now
receive an additional five years of FDA exclusivity, tacked on to
whatever exclusivity period they would have otherwise been entitled,
giving QIPD manufacturers a potential for twelve years of FDA
exclusivity. 240 During those twelve years, generic manufacturers cannot
file patent challenges to the brand’s QIPD under the traditional HatchWaxman framework, essentially barring generic adversaries from
entering the courthouse doors.
In the post-adjudicatory review context, the FTC’s concern with
patent hold-up in standard setting organizations similarly appears to
have been affected by industry capture. In a typical SSO, industry
members agree to adopt certain technologies or protocols in the
235. Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-114 (codified in 21
U.S.C § 355 (2012)).
236. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2012 & Supp. 2013).
237. Robert N. Sahr, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act: Innovation Must
Come Before Price Competition, B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F., July 19 2009, at 10 (“Since the
passage of HWA, generic pharmaceutical companies have challenged the validity and enforceability
of patents on nearly every profitable medicine as soon as the FDA exclusivity period expires.”).
238. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 717, 722–23 (2005) (describing the uncertainties of patents for new uses of old drugs, citing
the invalidation of the patents on an antibiotic, Augmentin); Carl Nathan & Frederick M. Goldberg,
The Profit Problem in Antibiotic R&D, 4 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 887 (2005) (describing
the lack of profitability and public health issues concerning antibiotics); Scott Hensley & Bernard
Wysocki, Jr., As Industry Profits Elsewhere, U.S. Lacks Vaccines, Antibiotics, WALL STREET J.,
Nov. 8, 2005, at A1 (describing the profitability and public health issues facing antibiotic
manufacturers).
239. 21 U.S.C. § 355f (2012 & Supp. 2013) (extending the FDA exclusivity period for qualified
infectious disease products).
240. Jacob S. Sherkow, The GAIN Act Stacks 5-Years of Market Exclusivity for Antibiotics,
PATENTLY-O, Oct. 3, 2012, http://perma.cc/D4CF-A4DL.
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development of a new technology, in order to facilitate interoperability
and consumer adoption. 241 Recognizing that many patents, owned by a
variety of members, may cover the proposed industry standard, SSOmembers typically agree to license any of their intellectual property that
may end up covering the standardized technology. 242 SSO members with
particularly valuable patents may, however, hold out on their licensing
commitments or wait until the standard is adopted before disclosing their
interests. 243 This threat of holdup can raise antitrust concerns, like those
typically policed in the post-adjudicatory vein by the FTC. 244 In the
sprawling Rambus, Inc. v. F.T.C., 245 litigation, for example, Rambus,
Inc. failed to disclose its interest in several crucial pieces of intellectual
property concerning a Joint Electron Device Engineering Council
(JEDEC) standard for memory chips. 246 After the standard was set,
Rambus then sued several JEDEC members for patent infringement.247
These lawsuits, the FTC concluded after a lengthy investigation,
constituted a violation of the antitrust laws. 248
The FTC’s oversight over SSO patent litigation may seem
unobjectionable but for the fact that it typically serves to benefit bigger
industry players with large patent portfolios. A 2003 report from the
FTC concerning the intersection between intellectual property and
antitrust was based mainly on information “gathered from a 2002 survey
of a group of senior intellectual property managers at large companies,
which was sponsored by the Intellectual Property Owners
Association.” 249 That data did not include the views of “small- and
medium-sized businesses or those endeavoring to approach the issue
without a specific client or with a specific agenda in mind.” 250 Even
241. See Janice M. Mueller, Patenting Industry Standards, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 897, 904
(2001) (“Three primary factors are driving the rise of standards-setting: product interoperability,
public health and safety, and global competitiveness.”).
242. See Contreras, supra note 25, at 50–52 (“[M]any [SSOs] have promulgated internal policies
designed to mitigate these risks. Perhaps the most prevalent of these is a requirement that [SSO]
participants license their patents to all potential vendors of technologies implementing those
standards on terms that are ‘fair,’ ‘reasonable,’ and ‘non-discriminatory’ (FRAND).”).
243. Id. at 48–49.
244. Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Commission, supra note 96, at 14.
245. 522 F.3d 456, 469 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009).
246. See Joel M. Wallace, Rambus v. F.T.C. in the Context of Standard-Setting Organizations,
Antitrust, and the Patent Hold-Up Problem, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 661, 676–83 (2009)
(reviewing the Rambus litigation).
247. Id. at 678.
248. Id. at 680.
249. F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An Unconventional
Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J. 327, 413 (2006).
250. Id.
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Rambus, at the time JEDEC set its standard for memory chips, was “a
relatively small research firm . . . frustrated by many of the world’s
largest DRAM manufacturers who . . . argued that the Rambus patents
cover technologies that are too basic.” 251 In this way, the FTC’s postadjudicatory review of patent infringement suits among SSO members
seems to benefit larger, established industry players much more than IPheavy upstarts, who may not be able to afford a protracted FTC
investigation or weather whatever licensing rates the FTC may impose.
This counsels that the FTC’s review of SSO violations is “consistent
with a public choice agency capture story.” 252
The PTO also seems to have been subject to industry capture
regarding its role as an alternative forum to patent litigation. CBM
review, first included as a means of post-issuance review in the 2011
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, covers “a patent that claims a
method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or
other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a
financial product or service.” 253 The PTO’s language governing CBM
seems broad: “it permits parties accused of infringement to challenge
any CBM [patent] . . . on any validity ground.” 254 But in practice, it
seems pointedly directed at a small subset of patents—patents on digital
check-processing—on which large financial institutions were already
being sued when the Act was passed. 255 Banks responded to this “thorn
in their side” through Congressional and agency lobbying—in particular,
lobbying U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY)—and successfully
establishing CBM review as an entirely separate post-issuance
proceeding before the PTO. 256 The words of Ben Barnes, a Democratic
fundraiser who opposed the inclusion of CBM review, say it all: “I take
my hat off to the Bank of New York and the senior senator from New
York . . . . The banks worked very hard. I saw their footprints all over
the House, and Chuck Schumer is pretty good help.” 257

251. Stephen H. Haber et al., On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in
Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 235 (2008).
252. Kieff, supra note 249, at 413.
253. 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (2014).
254. Megan M. La Belle & Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Big Banks and Business Method Patents,
16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 431, 463 (2014).
255. See id. at 454–55 (discussing the infringement lawsuits concerning check-processing).
256. Id. at 462 (“In March 2011, the banks got what they wanted. The Senate adopted an
amendment to the reform bill, including a provision sponsored by Senators Schumer and Kyl that
established a new post-issuance review procedure exclusively for financial business method
patents.”).
257. Carter, supra note 19, at 3.
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Political Capture

In other instances, it is not industry groups that co-opt agencies’ roles
in patent litigation, but politicians. That is, some agency-mediated patent
litigation is so politically sensitive, or of such national significance, that
political branches of government attempt to co-opt the agencies involved
for their own ends. 258 Normatively, political capture may better conform
to democratic ideals than leaving important patent disputes to the
vicissitudes of private litigation mediated by unelected regulators. 259 But
political capture of agency involvement in patent litigation, like industry
capture of the same, nonetheless threatens the balance of innovation
policy. 260
Interestingly, however, political capture appears isolated to the
bookended agency functions in patent litigation: litigation gatekeeping
and alternative fora. Across each of these functions, political actors—
faced with politically important patent litigation—have co-opted the
agencies responsible for shepherding the underlying dispute, rather than
directing the course of the dispute itself. Political capture, as a problem
of agency involvement in patent litigation, has therefore seemingly
avoided becoming involved in the nuts and bolts of patent litigation.
Perhaps the most famous example of political capture of a patent
dispute concerns Cipro, the antibiotic approved to treat airborne anthrax
shortly before the 2001 anthrax-terrorism scare. 261 After demand and
public attention for the drug skyrocketed, it appeared that Cipro’s
manufacturer, Bayer, would be unable to produce enough of the drug to
meet demand. 262 Some of that shortfall stemmed from earlier patent
litigation, settled between Bayer and its generic rivals to keep generic
copies of Cipro off the market. 263 Politicians—sensitive to the public’s
potential outrage that “patent lawyers” could be preventing them from
258. See Ezra Ross & Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and
White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 505 (2011) (“Yet another
potential form of capture is political capture, in which elected officials or branches may co-opt
regulatory agencies for their own purposes.”).
259. See Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 33 n.87 (2010) (discussing the seeming overlap between political pressure and
democratic accountability).
260. See supra notes 226–228 and accompanying text.
261. See William A. Drennan, Changing Invention Economics by Encouraging Corporate
Inventors to Sell Patents, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1096–1108 (2004) (discussing the adoption of
Cipro following the anthrax-terrorism scare).
262. Id.
263. See Uché Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The
Pharmaceutical Industry, Ethics, and Global Trade, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 203, 266–73 (2005)
(discussing the earlier litigation).
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fighting terrorism—attempted to pressure the FDA to authorize generic
versions of Cipro in order to cheaply stockpile the drug, despite Bayer’s
valid, Orange Book-listed patents. 264 This “forced authorization”
essentially sought to circumvent the Hatch-Waxman Act framework of
brand-generic patent litigation. Approving a generic version of an
“Orange Book-protected” drug would have limited much of the resulting
patent litigation typically at issue prior to a generic’s approval, leaving
the parties to essentially fight over licensing rates after the fact. 265 At its
core, therefore, the legal basis for political intervention in the Cipro
dispute attempted to leverage the FDA’s role as a gatekeeper of
litigation.
Patent “march-in rights” have also long been rattled as the sabers of
politicians unhappy with ongoing patent disputes. 266 Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 203, any agency that funded part of a patented invention’s research
and development may “march in” and compel the patent holder to grant
a license on “reasonable” terms if the patent holder has not
commercialized the invention or the public health or safety require it. 267
To a large extent this power is a “paper tiger”; “[t]he federal government
has never exercised its march-in rights” and likely never will.268 But
some patent disputes have so occupied the public’s attention—or served
as such an excellent opportunity for political gain—that legislators have
nonetheless threatened to force agencies to use them. Access to AIDS
drugs is a particularly pointed example. In the early 2000s, the narrative
of “big pharma” patents stymying affordable access to HIV medication
had reached such a fever pitch in public discourse that even taking a
cautious approach to the issue was seen by many legislators as
politically dangerous. 269 Against that backdrop—and several patent
infringement lawsuits between brand and generic manufacturers 270—
264. Drennan, supra note 261, at 1104 n.260 (discussing Senator Schumer’s letter to the FDA
concerning the Cipro patents).
265. Id. The other component in Senator Schumer’s letter consisted of forcing Bayer to grant
compulsory licenses of its Cipro patents to its competitors, thus paving generics’ way for market
entry. With both the compulsory license of generic versions of Cipro, and the FDA’s approval, little
would have remained in terms of litigation other than establishing the licenses’ royalty rate.
266. See William O’Brien, Comment, March-in Rights Under the Bayh-Dole Act: The NIH’s
Paper Tiger?, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1403, 1414–23 (2013) (recounting the history of march-in
rights attempts by the NIH).
267. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1)–(2) (2012).
268. Jacob H. Rooksby, University Initiation of Patent Infringement Litigation, 10 J. MARSHALL
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 623, 629 (2011); see also O’Brien, supra note 266, at 1413 (describing
march-in rights as a “paper tiger”).
269. See J. Stephen Morrison, The African Pandemic Hits Washington, 24 WASH. Q. 197, 199–
201 (Winter 2001) (reviewing the U.S. political response to affordable HIV medication in Africa).
270. See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab. Inc., 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
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Abbott Laboratories’ massively increased the price of Norvir, a
component of HIV-treatment “cocktails,” which sparked public
outrage. 271 In response, eight U.S. Senators urged the NIH, which
funded some of the initial research giving rise to Abbott’s patents, to
exercise its march-in rights, potentially preempting or preventing patent
suits between Abbott and generics. 272 Again, the fulcrum of legal power
rested in the Senators attempting to use an agency’s ability to control
patent litigation, here, for the NIH to “use [its] expertise and synoptic
perspective to weigh costs and benefits and determine whether private
rights of action should lie at all.” 273
Recently, Apple and Samsung’s section 337 patented-import dispute
before the ITC has seemingly given rise to another form of political
capture. In the parties’ smartphone patent dispute, the ITC had
determined that Apple violated several of Samsung’s patents and voted
to enjoin the importation of certain Apple products into the U.S. 274
During the Presidential review period, however, the USTR then
disapproved of the ITC’s decision—the first time in a quarter-century
that it had done so. 275 The USTR’s decision was also particularly notable
because Apple had been one of the largest donors to the President’s
election campaigns and education initiatives. 276 The USTR’s decision to
overturn the injunction against Apple therefore seemed to serve as a
form of political capture over a patent dispute; here, by directing the
outcome of agency proceedings when used as an alternative forum for
patent litigation. To be clear, this is to say nothing about the USTR’s
decision on its own merits. To the extent that the purpose of USTR and
Presidential oversight over section 337 cases before the ITC is to place a
political check on internationally delicate patent disputes, the Apple case
may simply be an example of politics as they are supposed to be. Or, if
(concerning patents over azidothymidine for HIV treatment).
271. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, Price of AIDS Drug Intensifies Debate on Legal Imports, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2004, at A1 (“The recent decision by Abbott Laboratories to quintuple the price of
its crucial AIDS drug Norvir will be at the center of a federal hearing today in which AIDS groups
and consumer advocates plan to argue that the government should begin allowing the import of
cheaper drugs.”).
272. See Sean M. O’Connor, Intellectual Property Rights and Stem Cell Research: Who Owns the
Medical Breakthroughs?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 665, 704 (2005) (discussing the call to march-in on
Abbott’s patents).
273. See Engstrom, supra note 13, at 619–20.
274. In re Certain Elec. Devices, USITC Inv. No. 337–TA–724, 2012 WL 3246515, at *1 (Dec.
21, 2011) (USITC Comm’n Op.).
275. See Pezzano & Telep, supra note 168, at 25.
276. See, e.g., Shane Cole, Apple Contributes $100M to Obama’s ConnectED High-Speed
Internet for Education [u], APPLEINSIDER, (Feb. 4, 2014), http://perma.cc/JJM5-FBW6 (discussing
Apple’s $100 million donation).
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the purpose of section 337 disputes is to protect domestic industries at
the expense of foreign ones—even if foreign entities are the holders of
U.S. patents—then it appears that the USTR fulfilled its mandate.
Nonetheless, the USTR’s power—whether effectuated through the
realpolitik of campaign donations or political populism of protecting
domestic companies—is one of political capture in patent disputes.
D.

Settlement Uncertainty

Agency administration of patent litigation also complicates the
potential for private settlement. In a typical federal patent case, the
parties have several options to resolve their dispute prior to judgment.
They can stipulate to a dismissal of the action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41; 277 by consent, the parties may amend their pleadings
under Rule 15 to drop particular claims, such as counterclaims for
judgments of invalidity; 278 or the parties may enter into an agreed-upon
consent judgment. 279 Generally speaking, the leeway for the content of
any of these settlements is expansive; the parties may agree upon
judgment, so long as it is not unenforceable as a matter of public
policy. 280 And, given the enormous costs of even moderate patent
cases, 281 and the cognitive and scheduling burdens they place on district
courts, 282 the advantages of settling patent disputes are numerous. 283
But the leeway for settling patent disputes in the shadow of agency
oversight is much narrower. In numerous instances, the agency may
either hamper the parties’ attempt to settle or make unclear the true
effects of settling. Concerning the FTC’s oversight of Hatch-Waxman
277. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) (“[T]he plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order
by filing . . . a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.”).
278. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (“In all other cases [i.e., twenty-one days after service of a
pleading], a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the
court’s leave.”).
279. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (“A consent decree no
doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in some respects is contractual in nature. But it
is an agreement that the parties desire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a
judicial decree that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.”).
280. See Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368, 1372 (6th Cir. 1976) (“Settlement
agreements should therefore be upheld whenever equitable and policy considerations so permit.”).
281. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2013, at 34
(2013) (listing total end-costs patent lawsuits by demand).
282. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 9–17 (2010) (discussing
the cognitive burdens patent litigation places on generalist judges); Lemley, supra note 224, at 414–
15 (listing the time to judgment across the various federal districts).
283. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting,
“[w]here a case is complex and expensive . . . the public has a strong interest in settlement”); Aro,
531 F.2d at 1372.
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litigation, for example, the FTC has the authority to bar them outright. 284
Indeed, it is the settlements themselves, rather than the merits of the
underlying patent litigation, in which the FTC has been recently finding
antitrust violations. 285 In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 286
Solvay Pharmaceuticals, a brand manufacturer of a testosterone gel, had
fought a three-year long, costly, and risky patent dispute against several
generic companies, including Actavis’ predecessor, Watson
Pharmaceuticals. 287 Before the district court could render judgment, and
before any generic competitors could enter the market, Solvay entered
into several reverse payment settlement agreements with its
adversaries. 288 It was these settlement agreements—rather than the
principal litigation between Solvay and Watson—that initially caught the
FTC’s ire in Federal Trade Commission v. Watson Pharmaceuticals. 289
After the case and several companions wound their way to the Supreme
Court, the Court reinforced the FTC’s authority to prohibit settlements
that have the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.” 290
The FTC’s power to bar such settlements, now affirmed by the
Supreme Court, complicates Hatch-Waxman patent litigation going
forward. The benefits of settlement are still much the same: brand
pharmaceuticals get to ensure that their patents—and monopolies—
remain valid by disposing of their adversaries’ patent challenges;
generics receive a cash-payment and, often, an earlier date-of-entry than
if they had lost the litigation; and both sides get to put an end to the
expense and uncertainty of the underlying dispute. 291 But with the FTC
now supremely vested with the power to bar such settlements based on
their content, which settlements will retain their effect and evade FTC
scrutiny is little more than a guess. 292 Some reverse payments are
284. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012) (granting the FTC the power to prohibit “any unfair method of
competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce”); Fed. Trade Comm’n
v. Actavis Inc., __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229–30 (2013) (briefly noting the FTC’s authority to
bar unfair settlements).
285. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227–29 (discussing the FTC’s review of reverse payment
settlements).
286. __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
287. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1304–05 (11th Cir. 2012),
rev’d sub nom. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223.
288. Id. at 1305.
289. Id. (“After the settlement agreements ending the patent litigation were reported to the FTC
as required by 21 U.S.C. § 355 . . . the FTC filed an antitrust lawsuit against Solvay, Watson, Par,
and Paddock.”).
290. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
291. See supra notes 131–137 and accompanying text.
292. See generally Edlin et al., supra note 20, at 16 (discussing the practical difficulties in
crafting settlements after the Actavis decision).
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allowed, but only for “valuable services,” and in any event, “large”
payments are disfavored. 293 Patent weakness may be a marker for FTC
scrutiny, but such circumstances are neither “inferred nor needed” to
scuttle the settlement. 294 And consumer welfare will also play a
consideration in the FTC’s review of settlements—although which way
that cuts if the settlement proposes an earlier entry than the patents’
expiration dates remains as difficult an issue as before. 295 All in all, the
FTC’s post-adjudicatory review of patent litigation will likely
complicate litigation itself.
Similarly, the ITC must approve any settlements in section 337 cases
litigated before it. Under 19 C.F.R. § 210.12, the parties must move the
Administrative Law Judge to terminate an ITC investigation on the basis
of a settlement agreement. 296 But the Commission Rules require that the
motion must contain the settlement agreements themselves 297—often, a
point of sensitivity for litigants in a secretive field.298 In In re Certain
Zero-Mercury-Added Alkaline Batteries, 299 some parties attempted to
terminate their ITC dispute by filing redacted versions of their settlement
agreement before the ALJ. 300 The parties argued that “the release of [the]
confidential information [in the settlement agreements] will severely
prejudice them in future settlement negotiations.” 301 Nonetheless, the
ALJ rebuffed the parties’ attempt at secrecy and refused to terminate the
investigation unless the settling parties exchanged unredacted versions
of the agreements with all of the litigants. 302 Determining that the
standing protective order in the case provided enough protection, the
ALJ agreed with the non-settling parties that keeping the settlement
agreements confidential made it difficult to determine “whether the
settlement agreement is in the public interest.” 303 This public interest
determination—mandated by 19 C.F.R. § 210.50(b)(2)—may also sink
any proposed settlement agreements. Under the Commission Rules, the
ALJ must make a determination as to any settlement’s effect on “the
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Id. at 16–17 (discussing the FTC’s review of reverse payments, themselves).
Id. at 17.
Id.
19 C.F.R. § 210.21(a)(2) (2014).
Id. § 210.21(b)(1).
See Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 333 (1998) (reviewing the literature on the concerns regarding secret
settlement agreements).
299. Inv. No. 337-TA-493, 2003 WL 22683954, (Oct. 30, 2003) (USITC order).
300. Id. at *1.
301. Id.
302. Id. at *2.
303. Id. at *1.
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public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the U.S. economy,
the production of like or directly competitive articles in the United
States, and U.S. consumers.” 304
Together, these requirements may complicate the underlying patent
litigation. For litigants, assessing whether it is in their best interests to
make their settlement agreements public, and whether the agreements
can be structured to ensure a positive recommendation from the ALJ’s
public interest determination, may affect the parties’ positions taken
during the litigation itself.305 Particularly aggressive litigation tactics—
such as claiming that a vast number of the respondent’s imported
products infringe many U.S. patents—may ultimately doom any
settlement agreements that attempt to diminish the complained-about
harm to a domestic industry. At a minimum, however, the complexities
of settlement before the ITC may cause some patent holders to
reconsider it as an alternative forum of litigation, relative to the potential
for quick, easy, and secretive settlements under Rule 41 in federal court.
Several post-issuance proceedings in front of the PTO also allow for
settlement agreements under limited circumstances. For inter partes,
post-grant, and CBM reviews, the parties may agree to terminate any
proceedings before the PTO prior to the agency rendering its validity
decision. 306 And, like settlements before the ITC, the settlement
agreements themselves must be filed with the PTO and made public “on
a showing of good cause,” although the default presumption is for them
to be classified as “business confidential information.” 307 Settlements in
post-issuance proceedings are consequently allowed, although their
effect on future litigation is wholly unclear: there are no estoppel effects
as there are to late amendments under Rule 15 or consent judgments. 308
What this means for the enforceability of any agreements—outside the
usual boundaries of contract law— has yet to be tested. Thus, like
proceedings before the ITC, the tenuousness of settlement may
discourage litigants from using post-issuance proceedings as an
304. 19 C.F.R. § 210.50(a)(2) (2014).
305. See Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil
Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 979–83 (2010) (discussing the effect of the availability of
secret settlements on litigant behavior).
306. See Iancu & Haber, supra note 78, at 479.
307. 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) (2012) (concerning inter partes review); id. § 327(b) (concerning postgrant review).
308. Id. § 317(a) (“If the inter partes review is terminated with respect to a petitioner under this
section, no estoppel under section 315 (e) shall attach to the petitioner, or to the real party in interest
or privy of the petitioner, on the basis of that petitioner’s institution of that inter partes review.”); id.
§ 327(a) (“If the post-grant review is terminated with respect to a petitioner under this section, no
estoppel under section 325 (e) shall attach to the petitioner, or to the real party in interest or privy of
the petitioner, on the basis of that petitioner’s institution of that post-grant review.”).

09 - Sherkow - Final.docx (Do Not Delete)

248

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

4/13/2015 11:54 AM

[Vol. 90:205

alternative forum to patent litigation.
E.

Inconsistent Judgments

Finally, agency administration of patent litigation creates the potential
for inconsistent judgments, especially where agencies serve as
alternative fora to patent disputes. Because there are not clear preclusive
effects to agency decisions in patent disputes—either across agencies or
between agencies and federal courts—adversaries litigating in agency
tribunals may face the prospect of competing judgments on core issues
of invalidity or infringement. Inconsistent judgments here, as elsewhere,
threaten “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” 309 At
the extreme, inconsistent judgments may even “undermine[ ] respect for
law itself as well as the particular [agencies] involved.” 310
Section 337 cases in the ITC are, perhaps, the most problematic. In
the words of Sapna Kumar,
[w]hen a party litigates a patent infringement dispute in the ITC,
it does not lose the right to litigate in federal court. Thus, [a
patent holder] can pursue an ITC action in addition to a district
court action and can even receive conflicting judgments. . . .
[B]y allowing parallel proceedings and indeed almost
encouraging them, Congress has created the real possibility of
inconsistent results between ITC and district court
proceedings.” 311
This possibility of inconsistent results has, in several cases, turned
into reality. In a dispute between General Electric Company and several
Mitsubishi subsidiaries, the ITC rejected arguments that a wind turbine
patent was unenforceable for failing to properly disclose all of the
inventors. 312 Yet, in a later proceeding on the same patent before the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, the judge found
the same patent unenforceable on the grounds that the putative inventor
failed to put forward any evidence that he contributed to the claims of
the asserted patent. 313 This problem, though strange, does not seem
altogether rare. One recent survey of parallel ITC‒district court litigation
309. Cf. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (listing these normative
concerns in relation to pendent jurisdiction).
310. Cf. Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429, 472
(2003) (discussing these normative concerns in relation to international litigation).
311. Kumar, supra note 21, at 538–39 (quoting Kaisha v. Bombardier Inc., No. 00-cv-549, 2001
WL 1388911, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2001)).
312. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wilkins, 750 F.3d 1324, 1326–29 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (discussing the ITC
case).
313. Id. at 1329.
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concluded that thirty-nine percent of cases in which judgment had been
rendered both by the agency and the court contained inconsistent
judgments. 314
There also exists the potential for inconsistent judgments in postissuance proceedings before the PTO. In both inter partes and post-grant
reviews “that result[] in a final written decision,” the governing statutes
prohibit the petitioner from “assert[ing] either in a civil action . . . or in a
[section 337] proceeding before the International Trade
Commission . . . that the [contested patent] claim is invalid on any
ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during
[the proceeding].” 315 While this estoppel provision appears to prohibit
the bulk of invalidity claims in later-filed suits in district court and the
ITC, the statute’s language seemingly leaves large gaps regarding
concurrent proceedings. In a typical patent infringement lawsuit, the
accused infringer may concurrently file a counterclaim challenging the
validity of the patent in district court and institute one of the postissuance procedures available before the PTO.316 In these circumstances,
the district court proceedings would not be automatically stayed; rather
the parties would litigate invalidity issues concurrently. 317
This leaves several opportunities for inconsistent judgments. First,
where a speedy district court makes its invalidity determination before
the PTO, it is unclear what preclusive effect, if any, the district court
procedure has on the post-issuance proceeding. 318 Second, although the
statute prohibits the petitioner from “asserting” any invalidity claims in
district court that it could have brought before the PTO, it is unclear
what effect this language has on invalidity claims already asserted in
federal court. Because §§ 315’s and 325’s prohibition on asserting
foreseeable invalidity claims only attaches for post-issuance proceedings
that “result[] in a final written decision,” 319 it remains to be seen whether
a final written decision issued by the PTO strips petitioners of similar
314. Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A Review of
International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 457, 481 (2008); see also
Kumar, supra note 21, at 539 n.57 (discussing the U.S. Phillips Corp. v. Princo Corp., 361 F. Supp.
2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), vacated, 173 Fed. App’x 832 (Fed. Cir. 2006) litigation).
315. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012); see also id. § 325(e)(2) (using the same language).
316. Jennifer C. Bailey, Lessons Learned from the First Year of Inter Partes Reviews, 6
LANDSLIDE 13, 14 (2013–2014) (discussing a typical inter partes review case).
317. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2) (mandating stays only where the petitioner files a declaratory
judgment claim for invalidity against the patent holder); id. § 325(a)(2) (same).
318. See Kristen Jakobsen Osenga, Rethinking Reexamination Reform: Is It Time for Corrective
Surgery, or Is It Time to Amputate?, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 217, 235
(2003) (“While it is clear that a court’s determination of patent invalidity is binding on the PTO, the
binding effects of the PTO’s conclusions during [post-issuance examinations] are less clear.”).
319. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (inter partes review); id. § 325(e)(2) (post-grant review).
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invalidity counterclaims in active federal litigation, or whether the
statute’s language applies only to litigation filed after the PTO issues its
written decision. And third, because the invalidity contentions for inter
partes and post-grant reviews are limited to claims of anticipation and
obviousness, 320 i.e., claims under sections 102 and 103 of the patent
statute, district court litigation centering around other invalidity claims,
such as enablement under section 112, may produce strange—and
inconsistent—results.
III.

BETTER ADMINISTRATING PATENT LITIGATION

The solution to the problems of administrating patent litigation is not
to eliminate agency involvement in patent disputes. For all its faults,
agency oversight over patent litigation forms a critical component of
bringing regulated products to market, 321 ensures compliance with other
areas of law, 322 and, sometimes, serves as an expedient to resolving
litigation. 323 Eliminating agency oversight, wholesale, may not
ultimately be worth the savings. Rather, the solution to the problems of
administrating patent litigation is to better administrate patent litigation;
to allow administrative agencies to fulfill their functions without being
subject to gamesmanship or capture and without producing litigation
uncertainty or inconsistencies. This Part proposes several ways—cheap,
easy, and politically viable solutions—to better administrate patent
litigation.
A.

Enhancing Substantive Oversight

Perhaps counterintuitively, many of the problems with agency
administration of patent litigation come from the agencies’ myopic view
of their own powers. The FDA’s “purely ministerial” 324 approach to
policing its Orange Book listings leads to no shortage of regulatory
gamesmanship. 325 The PTO, long hamstrung by its lack of “substantive
authority,” suffers from endless problems in its attempt to coordinate its

320. Id. § 311(b) (inter partes review); id. § 321(b) (post-grant review).
321. See supra notes 50–57 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA’s role in patent litigation
concerning drugs under its purview).
322. See supra notes 95–113 and accompanying text (discussing the FTC’s role in patent
litigation that raises antitrust concerns).
323. See sources cited supra note 180 (discussing the speed of litigation in the ITC).
324. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2002) (“The FDA defends this
purely ministerial conception of its role in the Orange Book listing process by explaining that it
lacks both the resources and the expertise to police the correctness of Orange Book listings.”).
325. See supra notes 205–217 and accompanying text.
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post-issuance procedures with district court litigation. 326 And the U.S.
Trade Representative has consistently abdicated its power to review the
substance of section 337 litigation before the ITC, making it, albeit by
design, the subject of political whim. 327
There is no silver bullet to the problems associated with these narrow
views of agency power in patent litigation. The variety of agencies
involved in patent litigation have a variety of purposes, 328 and, as a
consequence, expanding an agency’s powers in one case may prove
beneficial in some cases but disastrous in others. Furthermore, altering
agency power or behavior in some instances may simply be practically
impossible for political or statutory reasons. Rather, solving the
problems that arise from chary views of administrating patent litigation
should ultimately depend on the function of the agency involved. Where
additional agency oversight of patent litigation will better “secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of parties’ disputes, 329 it
should be crafted to do so as long as providing the agency with such
powers is, itself, politically and economically feasible. Where additional
agency oversight would only complicate, prolong, or increase the cost of
private patent disputes, the agency should refrain from exercising such
authority.
Litigation gatekeeping serves as the principal function for which
agencies should possess more robust authority in patent disputes.
Ideally, agencies best fulfill their roles as “retail” gatekeepers where
they police “claims [that] are on net socially costly or stray beyond
legislative purposes.” 330 Doing so—properly—requires robust enough
authority to determine precisely which claims are socially costly or
statutorily corrupt.
In the FDA’s case, greater oversight over patent listings in the Orange
Book—including the power to “delist” improperly included patents on
its own initiative 331—would allow the FDA to better function as a
litigation gatekeeper, and seemingly solve some of the problems, such as
product hopping, that come with its current straitjacketed approach.
Many of the newly listed patents in product-hopping scenarios often
326. See Masur, supra note 11, at 295–304 (discussing the PTO’s lack of authority along several
metrics); Tran, supra note 8, at 831 (discussing the PTO’s authority in light of administrative law
principles).
327. See supra notes 274–276 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., supra notes 95–114 and accompanying text (discussing the many roles of the FTC
in patent litigation).
329. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
330. Engstrom, supra note 13, at 659.
331. See aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 236–37 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing the
FDA’s supposed lack of power to delist Orange Book patents).
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only dubiously cover the new formulation, or do not meet the FDA’s
own regulations regarding permissible listings. 332 Allowing this
regulatory gamesmanship to occur—with its attendant costly and timeconsuming patent disputes—does little to decrease social cost or fulfill
the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act, let alone promote
pharmaceutical innovation. 333 Investing the FDA with the power to
properly function as a litigation gatekeeper—by weeding out dubious or
improperly listed patents on its own initiative, without litigation—would
at least remove some of the incentives to game the Orange Book.
Despite the FDA’s long-standing practice to avoid “meddling” in
patent disputes, 334 the agency could easily be empowered with greater
authority to do so. Nothing in the operative statute, 21 U.S.C. § 355,
explicitly prohibits the FDA from taking a more active role in policing
Orange Book listings. To the contrary, § 355(b)(1)(G) conditions the
publishing of patent information in the Orange Book on the condition of
approving a New Drug Application, 335 which the FDA may delay or
withhold if the application “failed to contain the patent information
prescribed by [the statute].” 336 That information includes only patents
that actually “claim[ ] the drug [or a method of using the drug] for which
the applicant submitted the application . . . [that] could reasonably be
asserted” against a generic rival. 337 A reasonable interpretation of these
two provisions—one which the FDA could easily take—is that a New
332. See Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (allowing
Bristol–Myers Squibb Co. to list an Orange Book patent on an uncovered metabolite of the
reference drug); Cotter, supra note 59, at 1079 (“[T]he FDA does not monitor Orange Book
filings—thus providing little disincentive for patent owners to list weak patents, or until recently
multiple patents covering different aspects of the same drug—and it is clear that patent owners may
have a substantial incentive to ‘game’ the system by, for example, leveraging a weak patent or
series of patents into extended protection against generic competition.”); Lao, supra note 59, at
995–96 (discussing this in the context of In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
333. See Thomas F. Cotter, Patents, Antitrust, and the High Cost of Health Care, 13 ANTITRUST
SOURCE 1, 3–4 (2014) (reviewing work suggesting that there may be a social cost to product
hopping); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 709–10 (discussing gamesmanship’s behavior in light
of the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act, expediting generics to market while protecting brand
pharmaceuticals’ valid patents); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2012 (2007) (discussing the effects of similar behavior on
promoting innovation).
334. See Caraco Pharm. Lab. Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1677 n.2
(2012) (mentioning cases affirming the FDA’s failure to police Orange Book listings).
335. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(G) (2012) (“Upon approval of the application, the Secretary shall
publish [the patent] information submitted [by the applicant.]” (emphasis added)).
336. Id. § 355(d)(6) (“If the Secretary finds . . . that . . . the application failed to contain the patent
information prescribed by subsection (b) of this section . . . he shall issue an order refusing to
approve the application.”).
337. Id. § 355(b)(1)(G) (emphasis added).
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Drug Application that lists patents which do not cover the drug listed in
the New Drug Application, or for which a reasonable claim of
infringement could not be asserted against a generic competitor, fail to
include the specific “patent information” required by the statute and
therefore cannot be approved. This is not far removed from the FDA’s
current interpretation, which construes the statute as prohibiting
“[p]rocess patents, patents claiming packaging, patents claiming
metabolites, and patents claiming intermediates” from being listed in the
Orange Book. 338 Thus, a simple, interpretive change at the direction of
the agency itself, could invigorate—and better—the FDA’s authority as
a gatekeeper of patent litigation.
The ease and simplicity with which the FDA could better administrate
patent litigation stands in stark contrast to the opportunities available to
the PTO and the USTR. The PTO, unlike the FDA, possesses no
authority to enact regulations interpreting the substantive provisions of
the patent statute. 339 Rather, it is generally limited to rulemaking
concerning the “conduct of proceedings” before it.340 Scholars have long
complained about this artificial and seemingly odd constraint. 341 Yet, the
PTO’s lack of substantive authority is both embedded in statute and in a
long line of judicial opinions excluding the agency from the rigors, and
benefits, of traditional policymaking. 342 Congress has also had multiple
opportunities to expand the PTO’s authority and, even with the recent,
expansive overhaul of the patent statute, did little to vest the PTO with
any more authority than it was previously given. 343 In the end,
expanding the PTO’s authority to be a proper administrative gatekeeper
of litigation seems to be statutorily, judicially, and politically
troublesome. Expanding the PTO’s authority, here, may simply be too
costly or socially problematic, or stray too far from the patent statute’s
legislative framework to recoup whatever efficiency gains are otherwise
lost by reorienting the agency around a new role.

338. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(b)(1) (2014).
339. See Tran, supra note 8, at 831.
340. Id. at 843 (discussing this limitation).
341. See, e.g., John M. Golden, The USPTO’s Soft Power: Who Needs Chevron Deference?, 66
SMU L. REV. 541, 541 (2013) (“Nonetheless, in terms of recognized power to speak on substantive
questions of law, the USPTO can seem an institutional mite.”); Masur, supra note 11, at 275–80;
Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1132 (2003) (expressing doubt the PTO has the expertise it needs); Tran,
supra note 8, at 843.
342. See 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (granting the PTO its limited powers); Tran, supra note 8, at 841–
54 (discussing the line of cases interpreting § 2).
343. Tran, supra note 8, at 843–44 (noting that the America Invents Act did little to grant the
PTO a slate of “traditional” substantive rule-making authority).
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Similarly, the USTR seems hemmed in to its current role as a political
subordinate, rather than an agency with experienced oversight of patent
disputes before the ITC. This may be, simply, because the statute
commands it as such. Section 337(j)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 allows
only the President to disallow an ITC finding, and only for “policy
reasons”; 344 it is otherwise pregnantly silent on whether the President
may do so as a substantive check on litigation before the ITC.
Furthermore, the current USTR’s involvement stems only from the
President delegating his authority to the agency, 345 making its
decisions—by their very nature—political ones. Expanding the USTR’s
authority to function as a core gatekeeper of patent litigation, therefore,
may actually defeat its own statute’s legislative purposes, even if they
were to be administered for the purpose of better effectuating the patent
statute.
B.

Utilizing Expertise

Industry capture of patent litigation often occurs in the shadows.
Industry groups’ attempts to lobby Congress for private gain in their
patent disputes may not be readily visible. 346 And agencies’ patent
litigation decisions—even those that appear to have an element of
purchase—may only circumstantially support the conclusion that they
were issued for the benefit of particular industry players. 347 In some
cases, proving political capture appears to be even more difficult,
leaving the public only to guess whether controversial agency decisions
were the subject of political spoilsmanship. 348
Like corruption, an effective solution to these capture problems in
patent litigation lies in opening agency and political decision-making to
public scrutiny. In the famous words of Justice Louis B. Brandeis:
“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman.” 349 Publicized agency opinions concerning
patent litigation should make their reversal through capture politically

344. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(j)(2) (2012).
345. Assignment of Certain Functions Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 70 Fed. Reg.
43251 (July 21, 2005) (delegating the President’s authority under Section 337 to the USTR).
346. See supra notes 235–240 and accompanying text.
347. See Kieff, supra note 249, at 413 (discussing the Rambus litigation).
348. See supra notes 274–275 and accompanying text (discussing the USTR’s disallowance of
the ITC’s import injunction against Apple).
349. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting LOUIS B. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S
MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (1933)).
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painful. 350 Having the FDA on record, for example, as expressing
concern over new antibiotics 351 should make its acquiescence on
antibiotic-proliferating patent policy somewhat suspect. 352
Administrative law scholars have often focused on repeated industry–
agency interaction as one cause of industry and political capture.353 But
repeatedly utilizing administrative agencies’ scientific and technical
expertise in patent litigation may actually prevent the sort of industry
and political capture that affects other regulatory areas. First, utilizing
scientific and technical agencies as litigation experts puts the agency “on
record” for important and cutting-edge issues. Repeated testimony in a
particular area of science or technology would be difficult to disclaim
should the agency abruptly change its mind in the face of industry
pressure. 354 Furthermore, because of the public nature of most patent
disputes 355—at least, more so than the traditional rule-making
process 356—the “information deficit” typically associated with
350. Cf. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1645 (1995) (discussing the political fallout of EPA policy reversals during the Reagan
administration).
351. See generally Paul H. Rubin, The FDA’s Antibiotic Resistance, REGULATION Winter 2004–
2005 (discussing the FDA’s past disinclination toward approving new antibiotics).
352. Anthony So & Robert Weissman, Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now: GAIN—Or Just
Greed, HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2012), http://perma.cc/JY5H-LF6M (investigating the FDA’s
silence regarding the GAIN Act).
353. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2264–65
(2001) (“The view that firms subject to regulation had ‘captured’ the agencies gained wide currency
beginning in the 1960s. . . . [F]ew could argue with its basic insight—that well-organized groups
had the potential to exercise disproportionate influence over agency policymaking by . . . the longterm relations they maintained with agency officials.”); Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1044 (2011) (“[C]ontinuous relationships are a double-edged sword: frequent
interaction may lead to a capture scenario in which the legislator is acting for the interest group
rather than a broader constituency, regardless of presented information.”); D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting
Anticompetitive Government Interventions That Benefit Special Interests, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.
119, 134 (2009) (“[B]ecause sector regulators focus on a specific industry, as repeat players they are
more prone than antitrust agencies to capture by those in a particular industry with a vested interest
in sector outcomes.”).
354. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (“An agency’s view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or
without a change in circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned
analysis . . . .” (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.
1970))); Holly Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act: Why Better Science
Isn’t Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1125–27 (1997) (discussing the political fallout
of “agency about-faces” in the context of endangered species); Steve Lohr, F.C.C. Is Deluged With
Comments on Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2014), http://perma.cc/6APE-YW5V
(reporting on the public backlash against the FCC following its policy reversal on “net neutrality”).
355. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 95.
356. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
437, 447 (2003) (“Agencies increasingly turn to less formal, less accountable, and more opaque
methods of making regulatory policy.”).
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regulatory capture should shrink. 357 Second, because patent litigation—
like all litigation—is adversarial, there should be less of a concern of
industry capture as a whole. All things being equal, there is no reason to
think that, for any given patent case, an agency would play favorites. 358
And third, and relatedly, if agency expertise in litigation is deployed
early enough in an industry’s lifecycle—historically, when patent
disputes often begin to arise 359—the agency is less likely to be captured
by established, well-heeled companies because few yet exist.360 These
factors all suggest that, in utilizing agency expertise in patent litigation,
agencies have little incentive but to “get the science right.”361
An increase in utilizing agency expertise would also have the salutary
effect of bettering the scientific information available to courts and juries
in patent disputes. Generalist district courts famously struggle with the
scientific and technical issues involved in patent cases. 362 In a now
famous, off-hand remark, Chief Judge Patti B. Saris described patent
litigation as “the neurosurgery of litigation: it is hard scientifically and it
is hard legally.” 363 And while judges can avail themselves of a variety of
procedures to educate them about the scientific issues in dispute, 364 there
357. See Nicholas Bagley, Response, Agency Hygiene, 89 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 2 (2010)
(“[Political branches] need information in order to establish whether capture has taken hold, to
understand the contours of the relevant capture dynamic, and to suggest agency-specific strategies
for ameliorating capture.”).
358. See JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 336 (1973) (describing this phenomenon
in considering an industry with multiple, well-organized companies).
359. See Colleen V. Chien, Reforming Software Patents, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 325, 328–29 (2012)
(discussing several “patent wars” in technologies’ early stages of development). The recent “patent
troll” problem, however, has taken the reverse tack. Patent holders will wait until an industry fully
matures—and where greater damages are available—before suing for infringement. See Robert P.
Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1583, 1591 (2009) (“Typically, the troll waits until a technology is fully entrenched
before scouting around for patents to acquire or asserting the patents it holds.”).
360. See David A. Strifling, Environmental Federalism and Effective Regulation of
Nanotechnology, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1129, 1174–75 (2010) (“By definition, emerging
technologies are new, and thus capture seems less likely because of the absence of the factors that
are typically thought to cause it: a well-established industry lobby; agency officials with previous
experience in industry, and vice versa; and little or no local political pressure.”).
361. Cf. Wendy E. Wagner, Importing Daubert to Administrative Agencies Through the
Information Quality Act, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 589, 593 (2004) (“Because of its vulnerability to multiple
reprimands from the courts, Congress, the White House, and the public at large, agencies have many
reasons to get the science right the first time, particularly when their science-based decisions have
direct and significant consequences for public health and the economy.”).
362. See Lee, supra note 282, at 9–17 (discussing patent cases’ cognitive burdens on generalist
judges).
363. Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective
of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682 (2004) (statement of Hon. Patti B. Saris).
364. See Karson Thompson, Note, Luddites No Longer: Adopting the Technology Tutorial at the
Supreme Court, 91 TEX. L. REV. 199, 221–25 (2012) (briefly discussing the courts’ employment of
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is little guarantee that the parties will best explain the scientific and
technical concepts most conducive to an impartial assessment of the
facts. 365 If anything, the high-stakes nature of most patent litigation—
especially pharmaceutical patent litigation—strongly encourages
litigants to play fast and loose with scientific concepts in an effort to
simply persuade fact-finders of their claims. 366 Having independent,
neutral participants—like scientific or technical agencies—in patent
disputes may, therefore, be helpful. 367 Traditionally, courts have focused
their attention on individual court-appointed experts, special masters, or
technical advisors. 368 These have, by and large, been successful—if quite
underutilized—approaches to the “scientific capture” problem. 369 But
that underutilization stems from their difficulty to implement:
“compensation, judicial propriety, neutrality, difficulties in locating
experts, timing, and ex parte communication” have all hampered the use
of independent third-parties educating the court on matters of science or
technology. 370 Enhancing agencies’ functions as experts, therefore, may
provide another avenue to providing courts with independent
assessments of scientific and technical facts in patent litigation.
At the same time, this is easier said than done. Mechanically, agencies
are generally barred from intervening in private litigation by section 516
of the Judiciary Code, which reserves agencies’ litigation authority to
the DOJ. 371 But section 516 serves as a floor rather than a ceiling for
agency litigation. While the DOJ, writ large, is responsible for the
scientific advisors, special masters, court-appointed experts, and technologies tutorials in “bridging
the technological gap”).
365. See Rai, supra note 341, at 1099 (“It is by no means clear, however, that adversarial
procedures that rely on a ‘battle of the experts’ represent the best mechanism for educating lay
persons about the relevant science.”).
366. See Developments in the Law—Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1586 (1995) (“[S]ome experts are willing to testify to virtually anything for
the right price.”).
367. Cf. Bock, supra note 14, at 242–49 (describing the advantages of a neutral, third-party
litigant in patent disputes to ameliorate contentiousness).
368. See Joshua R. Nightingale, An Empirical Study on the Use of Technical Advisors in Patent
Cases, 93 TECHNICAL ADVISORS IN PAT. CASES 400, 408–19 (2011) (empirically examining courts
use of these procedures); Thompson, supra note 364, at 221–25 (describing the procedures
required).
369. See Nightingale, supra note 368, at 408–12 (describing each of these procedures as “rare” or
“mysterious and foreign”).
370. Id. at 410 (quoting John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary
Patent Cases, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413, 1427 (2003)).
371. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in
which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the
Attorney General.”); see also note 114 and accompanying text.
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conduct of litigation involving agencies, it is not immune, by law or by
practice, from conferring, employing, and even taking orders from
agencies regarding the direction of litigation.372 Agencies are therefore
free to push the DOJ to allow it to intervene in patent litigation where
their interests are not adequately represented, or where there exist
concerns that the parties’ descriptions of the technology at issue would
cause harm to a regulated industry. As the National Institute of Health’s
interaction with the Solicitor General in the Myriad litigation
demonstrates, this is neither unheard of nor unfeasible. 373 Many other
agencies on the cutting-edges of science and technology—such as
NASA, the National Science Foundation, and the Department of
Energy—could play equally valuable roles in current, high-profile patent
disputes. 374
But, even where an agency’s negotiation with the Solicitor General’s
office comes to naught, the agency could still provide its expertise to
patent litigation cheaply and easily: through the agency white paper. As
demonstrated by the FTC’s and ITC’s white papers on patent litigation,
courts are receptive to agencies’ positions in private litigation if the
litigation directly concerns an agency interest. Where the white paper
has the ability to provide the court with a public view of the scientific or
technical issues in dispute, courts have seemed to pay attention. 375
Scientific white papers in patent litigation should be no exception.
To be clear, expanding scientific agency expertise into patent
litigation is nothing close to a cure for the problems of industry or
political capture—whether in patent litigation or outside of it. And it is
frankly difficult to determine just how well employing such expertise
would function when used by an agency that has already been
thoroughly captured by industry or political interests. 376 But utilizing
372. See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 302 (1994) (“[I]ndependent agency autonomy
likewise will ebb and flow.”); Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of
Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 562–63 (2003) (“Should DOJ learn
of possible [civil] violations warranting investigation, it forwards the information to the agency; an
actual civil action will not go forward without a referral from the agency to DOJ.”); Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841, 921 (2014) (“[W]hile litigation
authority is usually defined in terms of the levels of the federal courts, some boundary organizations
have more unusual arrangements.”).
373. See supra notes 110–116 and accompanying text.
374. See, e.g., Par Pharm. Inc. v. TWi Pharm. Inc., CIV. CCB-11-2466, 2014 WL 694976 (D.
Md. Feb. 21, 2014) (nanotechnology); ViaSat Inc. v. Space Sys./Loral Inc., 3:12-CV-00260-HWVG, 2013 WL 3927750 (S.D. Cal. May 17, 2013) (aerospace); Ecolochem Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison
Co., 863 F. Supp. 1165, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 91 F.3d 169 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (nuclear reactors).
375. See supra notes 122–130 and accompanying text.
376. Cf. Bagley, supra note 357, at 2 (questioning whether the solutions to capture are the same
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agency expertise in patent litigation should at least make such capture
more noticeable and, as a consequence, agency inconsistency on issues
of science and technology more painful. Like traditional expert
witnesses, being forced to speak loudly, clearly, and on the record, at
least encourages openness and consistency. 377
C.

Diminishing Alternative Fora

Many of the problems of administrating patent litigation come from
agencies’ roles as alternative fora to patent disputes. The availability of
alternative fora serves as a tool of gamesmanship by parties unsatisfied
with district court proceedings; as loci of both industry and political
capture; as a source of significant settlement uncertainty; and as a cause
of inconsistent judgments in patent disputes. 378 Here, the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is enlightening: “[t]here is
one form of action—the civil action.” 379 Having a single form—and
forum—of action to resolve patent disputes has been more sensible,
efficient, and just since the Federal Rules merged law and equity almost
eighty years ago. 380 Diminishing the availability of alternative fora to
patent disputes should funnel patent disputes to federal district court—a
generalized forum unencumbered by the procedural or remedial
restrictions of administrative agencies—and ameliorate many of the
problems associated with agency involvement in patent litigation. While
abolishing alternative fora completely is likely politically untenable,
courts, agencies, and potentially Congress, could make several simple
fixes to various facets of alternative review in order to route patent
litigation back to district court.
1.

Narrowing Claimants

The first step to diminishing alternative fora to patent litigation is to
narrow the claimants for whom alternative fora are available. Each
for agencies that have already been captured).
377. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 597 (1980) (“[O]pen examination
of witnesses viva voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much more conducive to the clearing up of
truth, than the private and secret examination . . . where a witness may frequently depose that in
private, which he will be ashamed to testify in a public and solemn tribunal.” (ellipses in original)
(quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 373 (1768))).
378. See supra Part II (discussing each of these problems with respect to Section 337 proceedings
before the ITC, and the PTO’s post-issuance procedures).
379. FED. R. CIV. P. 2.
380. See Amanda Frye, “Inextricably Commingled”: A Restitution Perspective in Patent
Remedies, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 669, 673–75 (2013) (discussing the difficulties with
distinguishing law and equity in the patent context).
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forum offers few restraints as to who can file a petition. Anyone, for
example, may file a request that the PTO reexamine a patent. 381
Similarly, “nearly every patentee can bring [a section 337] ITC
complaint,” 382 so long as the patentee demonstrates that there exists a
“domestic industry” for the patented goods. 383 The PTO’s new postissuance procedures—inter partes, post-grant, and CBM reviews—are
slightly more restrictive, but barely so. Any person “other than the patent
owner” may bring petitions for inter partes and post-grant reviews,384
while CBM petitions may be brought by anyone merely threatened for
infringement of the asserted patent. 385
These loose restrictions on the availability of alternative fora to patent
litigation make the procedures ripe for abuse. Opening reexam, inter
partes, and post-grant reviews to anyone—whether or not they have a
significant interest in the patents at-issue—allows business competitors
to potentially drag patent holders through preemptive litigation, without
word on how the patent holders will make use of their patents. 386
Analogously, allowing virtually any patent holder to file a section 337
complaint in the ITC threatens to hold up entire technologies and private
markets irrespective of the degree of harm caused by the alleged
infringement or the fraction of which the accused technologies fall

381. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (“Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the
Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under the provisions of section
301.”).
382. Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 15.
383. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2012) (banning the importation of patent infringing goods “only if
an industry in the United States, relating to the articles protected by the patent . . . exists or is in the
process of being established”); see also Taras M. Czebiniak, When Congress Gives Two Hats,
Which Do You Wear? Choosing Between Domestic Industry Protection and IP Enforcement in
§ 337 Investigations, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 115–16 (2011) (discussing the contours and
history of the “domestic industry” requirement).
384. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012) (“[A] person who is not the owner of a patent may file with the
Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of the patent.”); id. § 321(a) (“[A] person who is
not the owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute a post-grant review of the
patent.”).
385. 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) (2014) (“A petitioner may not file with the [PTO] a petition to
institute a covered business method patent review of the patent unless the petitioner, the petitioner’s
real party-in-interest, or a privy of the petitioner has been sued for infringement of the patent or has
been charged with infringement under that patent.”).
386. Raymond A. Mercado, Ensuring the Integrity of Administrative Challenges to Patents:
Lessons from Reexamination, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 558, 602 (2013) (discussing patent
holders’ view of reexam as “gamesmanship”); Wayne B. Paugh, The Betrayal of Patent
Reexamination: An Alternative to Litigation, Not A Supplement, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 177, 214 (2009)
(“Ex parte reexam would still be able to function effectively as an option over the lifetime of the
patent, but it should be curtailed as a method of litigation ‘gamesmanship’ through congressional
action.”).
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within the patents’ claims. 387 At their core, these abuses are forms of
regulatory gamesmanship. 388
Ideally, these alternative fora for patent disputes should be tailored to
limit complainants to those the procedures were designed to protect. 389
But the nature and purpose of many of these procedures is not entirely
clear. With respect to the America Invents Act’s new post-issuance
procedures in the PTO, some were designed seemingly without an ideal
complainant in mind. 390 And, in section 337 proceedings before the ITC,
the historical loosening of the “domestic industry” requirement has
seemed to “destroy section 337’s protective purpose, because the
broader domestic industry definition under the new section 337 gives
foreign owners of U.S. intellectual property rights the same ease of
access to the ITC.” 391 A better approach would be instrumental. That is,
to the extent these alternative fora to patent disputes simply serve as
another means to obtain substantive opinions of patents’ validity, the
availability of alternative review should be narrowed to ensure that
patent disputes are quickly docketed and disposed of in district court.
Siphoning patent cases away from alternative fora and into court
could be accomplished in several ways. First, where it appears that
petitioners for inter partes and post-grant reviews are using the
procedures simply for the purpose of “gaming” parallel district court
litigation, the Director of the PTO should exercise her discretion to deny
those petitions. Under section 314, the Director may deny petitions for
inter partes review unless the petitioner shows “a reasonable likelihood
that [it] would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged
in the petition.” 392 Similarly, under section 324, the Director may only
grant petitions for post-grant review if “the information presented in the
petition . . . would demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least
387. See Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 24–25 (“Patent holdup tends to occur in complex,
multicomponent products, particularly in information technology industries. . . . The social harm in
this latter case is disproportionate to the social benefit, as many productive, noninfringing
components will be shut down to give the patentee control over only a single, small component.”).
388. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 18, at 687 (describing regulatory gamesmanship as
“private behavior that harnesses procompetitive or neutral regulations and uses them for
exclusionary purposes”).
389. Cf. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (limiting
standing to “the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question”).
390. See Iancu & Haber, supra note 78, at 486 (“[I]t is unclear how a Post-grant Review will
relate to Inter Partes Review.”).
391. Anne L. Spangler, Note, Intellectual Property Protection and Import Trade: Making Section
337 Consistent with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 222
(1991).
392. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012).
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[one] of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” 393 In
either case, the Director should take into consideration the high bar to
invalidating patents—”clear and convincing evidence” 394—and should
deny those petitions that, because of their procedural posture, appear
likely to fail to carry that burden. Even when such petitions are “close
calls,” the Director should still deny those petitions if federal court
remains an available venue to contest issues of the patents’ validity.
Where the patent disputes are substantial enough to merit federal
litigation—likely, given that the fees for inter partes and post-grant
reviews are a whopping $27,200 and $35,800, respectively—this should
drive those disputes to federal court, where the court can resolve all
issues of invalidity and infringement in a single forum. While denying
petitions on such grounds may be controversial, the Director should take
solace that denials of inter partes and post-grant reviews are “final and
nonappealable.” 395
Second, with respect to CBM review, the Director has substantial
authority to determine whether the patent at-issue constitutes a “covered
business method” patent—and by extension, to deny CBM petitions
where the petitioner has failed to “demonstrate that the patent for which
review is sought is a covered business method patent.” 396 For the same
reasons, the Director should deny those petitions that are “close calls”
under the PTO’s own definition of “covered business method patent,” 397
and take comfort in the fact that denials are also final and
nonappealable. 398
Lastly, reforming the class of claimants in the ITC will likely be more
difficult than narrowing petitions to post-issuance proceedings before the
PTO. Namely, this is because the best option for slimming section 337
complaints—strengthening the domestic industry requirement—has long
been bloated from gross expansion and general disuse. 399 As noted by
Colleen V. Chien and Mark A. Lemley, however, the ITC’s discretion
over determining whether a section 337 complaint has merited the
393. Id. § 324(a).
394. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (“We consider
whether § 282 requires an invalidity defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. We
hold that it does.”).
395. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (inter partes review); id. § 324 (post-grant review).
396. 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(a) (2014).
397. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a) (defining “covered business method patent”).
398. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 329
(2011) (requiring CBM review to “employ the standards and procedures of, a post-grant review”);
35 U.S.C. § 324 (making post-grant review “final and nonappealable”).
399. See Czebiniak, supra note 383, at 115–16 (discussing the expansion of the domestic industry
requirement).
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“public interest” is broad. 400 Under 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1), the ITC may
refuse to enjoin the importation of patent infringing products if the
injunction would negatively affect “the public health and welfare,
competitive conditions in the United States economy, the production of
like or directly competitive articles in the United States, [or] United
States consumers.” 401 Such determinations, sadly, are typically pro
forma, reflexively favor the patentee, and come after the ITC has made
its Initial Determination regarding invalidity and infringement. 402 But
there is no reason why the ITC cannot give these statutory public interest
factors more teeth—and more specifically, decide them before the
parties’ principal section 337 dispute. Indeed, if the public interest
factors are negative, such a conclusion would seem to obviate patent
disputes in the ITC in the first instance: without the possibility of a
remedy, there is little point in carrying on litigating. Such an approach
would salvage an agency increasingly under attack, 403 save ITC litigants
time and money, and ultimately, shuttle the most problematic patent
disputes to district court. Furthermore, making such a determination
about the availability of remedies prior to assessing issues of invalidity
or infringement would not be unprecedented in patent litigation. A
growing number of patent cases proceed through bifurcation of
damages—an assessment of damages before litigating invalidity or
infringement. 404 The reasons for the popularity of the procedure are
simple enough: it “discourage[s] patent holders from bringing suits in
instances where the potential damages are minimal compared to
litigation costs . . . [and] encourage[s] earlier settlement.” 405 As with
traditional federal litigation, the absence of a remedy in the ITC may
simply make section 337 complaints disappear—or at least, find their
way to district court.
400. Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 19–20 (discussing the statutory public interest factors).
401. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2012).
402. Chien & Lemley, supra note 10, at 19–21 (discussing this state of affairs).
403. See Thomas F. Cotter, The International Trade Commission: Reform or Abolition? A
Comment on Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, The ITC, and The Public Interest,
98 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 43, 43–44 (2013), http://cornelllawreview.org/files/2013/05/
Cotterfinal.pdf (calling for, and assessing the movement, to abolish the ITC).
404. See, e.g., Yamaha Hatsudoki Kabushiki Kaisha v. Bombardier Inc., 59 U.S.P.Q.2d 1088,
1090 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Bifurcation, while perhaps not routine, is nonetheless common in patent
litigation.”); Steven S. Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 725 (2000)
(“Bifurcation is also common in patent litigation . . . .”); Matthew B. Lowrie, Critical Issues in
Managing Patent Litigation, 44 IDEA 267, 279 (2004) (“A key strategic decision for the accused
infringer to make is whether to ask to bifurcate the issue of willfulness of infringement (and, with it,
damages) for discovery and trial.”).
405. Jason Rantanen, Reverse Bifurcation in Practice, PATENTLY-O (July 31, 2011),
http://perma.cc/4FQW-3DNV.
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Strengthening Estoppel

Strengthening the estoppel provisions of alternative fora to patent
disputes would also go a long way to solve some of the problems
inherent in the procedures, and to make better sense of their purpose
relative to federal litigation. Currently, the estoppel provisions of PTO
and ITC proceedings comprise a riot of standards. Reexamination
proceedings have no estoppel effect on district court or ITC litigation,
unless of course, the PTO cancels any of the reexamined claims. 406
Petitioners in inter partes and post-grant reviews are estopped from
asserting, in both district court and ITC proceedings, “any ground that
the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised,” 407 while CBM
petitioners may not assert, in district court or ITC proceedings, “any
ground that the petitioner [actually] raised during that [CBM]
proceeding.” 408 Section 337 proceedings before the ITC, meanwhile,
“have no preclusive effect in other forums,” 409 even on issues actually
raised before the ITC. 410 Like the differences among the classes of
potential claimants in alternative fora, the quirks of estoppel in these
procedures make them ripe for gamesmanship. 411 But, more
significantly, they lead to inconsistent judgments and create a cloud of
uncertainty regarding settlement. 412
Reforming these problems, however, may prove difficult. For reexam
and the new post-issuance procedures before PTO, the standards for
estoppel are chiseled into the statute. 413 Altering them would require an
affirmative act of Congress—unlikely given Congress’s recent
enactment of the procedures. 414 And, although the estoppel effect of
406. Andrei Iancu et al., Inter Partes Review Is the New Normal: What Has Been Lost? What Has
Been Gained?, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 539, 577 (2012) (discussing the estoppel provisions of reexams).
407. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012); id. § 325(e)(2).
408. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 18(a)(1)(D), 125 Stat. 284, 330
(2011). For an interpretation of the “actually raised” estoppel language, see Iancu & Haber, supra
note 78, at 488.
409. Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
410. Id. at 1568.
411. See Kumar, supra note 14, at 1573–75 (2011) (describing the lack of preclusion from section
337 proceedings, and its effects on litigants, as “illogical”); Robert L. Stoll, Maintaining Post-Grant
Review Estoppel in the America Invents Act Revisited: A Call for Legislative Restraint, 23 FED. CIR.
B.J. 15, 51–53 (2013) (describing potential forms of gamesmanship under the post-issuance
procedures’ estoppel provisions).
412. See supra notes 296–320 and accompanying text.
413. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2) (2012) (inter partes); id. § 325(e)(2) (post-grant); LeahySmith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(D) (covered business method).
414. See Stoll, supra note 411, at 19–25 (discussing Congress’s consideration of the estoppel
provisions).
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section 337 proceedings before the ITC is judicially rather than
statutorily mandated, 415 the Federal Circuit has repeatedly ruled against
binding federal courts with decisions from the ITC. 416
The solution, therefore, to these bizarre procedural circumstances
lies—somewhat counterintuitively—in the courts themselves. While it
may be an operative truth that some of the litigation alternatives in the
PTO and ITC do not technically bind federal courts as to issues of
invalidity or infringement, district courts can certainly take such
judgments as persuasive authority. 417 District courts may, therefore,
substantially rely on the decisions of the PTO and ITC in making their
own determinations if they choose.
In some notable instances, this has already occurred. In Old Reliable
Wholesale, Inc. v. Cornell Corp., 418 the Federal Circuit “acknowledged
[the PTO’s] expertise in evaluating prior art and assessing patent
validity” after the PTO issued a reexamination certificate confirming the
validity of all of the appellant’s patent’s claims. 419 The court concluded
that “[t]he fact that the PTO, after assessing the relevant prior art,
confirmed the patentability of all claims of the [asserted] patent
undercut[ the appellee’s] contention that [the patent holder] had no
reasonable basis for its assertion that its patent was not anticipated.” 420
Thus, although the Federal Circuit was clearly not bound by the results
of the PTO’s reexamination, it considered the agency’s determination to
be “probative evidence” on the defendant’s collateral claims. 421
Similarly, in Solomon Technologies, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Corp.,422 the
district court was faced with reviewing a patent dispute already decided
by the ITC in the accused infringers’ favor. 423 Although the court
415. See Tex. Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1568–69 (describing its decision as one relying on
legislative history, rather than statute).
416. See, e.g., Cognex Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 550 F. App’x 876, 881 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(denying review of the ITC’s finding that the asserted patent was ineligible for protection because
“decisions of the ITC involving patent issues have no preclusive effect in other forums”); Powertech
Tech., Inc. v. Tessera, Inc., 660 F.3d 1301, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting that “the resolution of the
ITC action will not have preclusive effect on either the district court in Texas or the district court in
this case”); Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Benun, 463 F.3d 1252, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (refusing to
“question the authority of a federal district court to prohibit importation of infringing goods after the
Commission has refused to issue a section 1337 general exclusion order”); Tex. Instruments, 90
F.3d at 1568–69.
417. See Kumar, supra note 14, at 1575 (suggesting this fix in regards to the ITC).
418. 636 F.3d 539 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
419. Id. at 548.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 549.
422. No. 8:05-cv-1702, 2010 WL 715243 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2010).
423. Id.
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acknowledged that “the ITC’s prior decision cannot have claim
preclusive effect in the district court,” 424 it forcefully concluded “that a
district court may consider as persuasive an ITC’s decision.” 425 Finding
“no ‘powerful incentive’ to deviate from the Federal Circuit’s prior
decision,” it framed the dispute as “the same parties argu[ing] whether
two of the same hybrid vehicles infringe the same claim in the same
patent as they argued previously before both [tribunals].” 426
Old Reliable Wholesale and Solomon, therefore, provide working
examples of how courts can—and should—follow the practice of finding
the PTO’s and ITC’s determinations persuasive, even if not technically
binding. Giving substantial credence to agency decisions of validity and
infringement removes the incentives to litigate in parallel, provides a
clear avenue to settlement once the agency proceedings are complete,
and erodes the potential for inconsistent judgments. Furthermore,
generalist district courts—already seemingly burdened by the time and
complexity of patent litigation 427—would benefit from the agencies’
expertise. 428 As mentioned by the Federal Circuit in Old Reliable
Wholesale, the PTO obviously possesses “expertise in evaluating prior
art and assessing patent validity.” 429 Putting that expertise in practice
requires little more than judicial notice.430 And lastly, such a practice, if
properly and routinely implemented, would be a boon to busy district
courts’ attempts to manage their docket, allowing judges to resolve some
issues of patent invalidity early and easily.
To be clear, to the degree that litigants prefer having their disputes
primarily heard in the PTO and the ITC rather than district court,
reforming the practice (and not the letter) of these estoppel provisions
gives them no greater incentive to litigate in federal court rather than the
agencies. In that sense, these proposals do not diminish the availability
of alternative patent litigation fora in the same way as narrowing the
classes of those fora’s claimants. But these proposals, if deployed
widely, would solve the problem of at least having some litigants
attempt to take two bites of the same apple. Some litigants clearly do
prefer district court to administrative practice, and seem only to litigate
424. Id. at *4 (quoting Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Lee, supra note 282, at 9–17 (discussing patent cases’ burdens on the judiciary).
428. See Old Reliable Wholesale, Inc. v. Cornell Corp., 635 F.3d 539, 548 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
Kumar, supra note 14, at 536–37 (discussing the ITC’s expertise in patent disputes).
429. 635 F.3d at 548.
430. Id. (taking judicial notice of the PTO’s reexamination, even though the outcome of the
proceedings was not before the district court).
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in parallel as a means to hedge their bets on the dispute’s ultimate
outcome. 431 Removing the incentives to such hedging should defang
much parallel litigation and, in that sense, diminish at least some
litigation in alternative fora.
3.

Streamlining Litigation Stays

Currently, the differing procedures regarding stays in alternative fora
of patent litigation are ripe for abuse. Litigants may take a wait-and-see
approach to district court litigation—filing pleadings and engaging in
discovery—before filing parallel litigation in the PTO or ITC in attempt
to stall things in federal court. 432 At their core, these strategies—allowed
by statute, and permitted by practice—are forms of gamesmanship. 433
But, because it may be difficult to determine how the agency will rule in
parallel proceedings—and whether the district court will take the
agency’s decision into account 434—stays may also make some district
court settlements uncertain. 435
Like the estoppel provisions governing PTO and ITC proceedings,
resolving these problems may prove difficult because they are deeply
embedded in the governing statute or litigation practice. 436 In concurrent
ITC and district court litigation, district courts must stay their
proceedings by operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a). 437 And, in parallel
proceedings before the PTO, district courts routinely stay cases pending
the Office’s decision. 438 District courts should, therefore, take a nuanced,
case-by-case approach to determining whether to grant litigants’ request
431. See Stoll, supra note 411, at 33 (discussing the potential for hedging).
432. See Scott M. Daniels & Kate Addison, Why Wait for Oppositions?, 47 IDEA 343, 355
(2007) (discussing litigants strategies regarding dual-track filings in district court and the PTO);
Hahn & Singer, supra note 314, at 482 (“When a case is pursued in both venues, the district court
often stays the district court case for the duration of the ITC process, after which the parties may
move to have the court vacate the stay. A patent holder could learn through the ITC determination
that its case is strong or weak, and then settle the district court case accordingly.”).
433. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 314, at 482; J. Jason Williams et al., Strategies for
Combatting Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 373 n.23 (2010) (“Gamesmanship may
include uses where there is a perceived lack of cooperation between parties or where the stay
appears primarily only to delay trial.”).
434. See supra notes 413–416 and accompanying text
435. See, e.g., Matthew A. Smith, Stay, Suspension and Merger: Considerations for Concurrent
Proceedings Involving Inter Partes Reexamination, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 657, 664
(2008) (“As for the likelihood of settlement, the patent owner will argue that a trial setting is more
likely to induce settlement than a stay of litigation where the third party requester has nothing to
lose.”).
436. See supra notes 72–92 and accompanying text.
437. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 79–92 and accompanying text.
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for stays pending the outcome of agency proceedings—in particular,
taking into account the preclusive effect (or the persuasive value) of the
agency’s opinion. Where litigation has substantially commenced in
federal court, and where it is unlikely the agency proceeding will have a
preclusive or persuasive effect, district courts should deny litigants’
requests for stays the best they can. Doing so—while setting firm trial
dates—will likely “resolve cases and reduce litigation costs.” 439
Oppositely, where federal litigation is relatively nascent, and where
litigants will likely be estopped from asserting certain issues in district
court depending on the outcome of the agency proceeding, courts should
freely grant stays. And, where courts are commanded by statute to stay
proceedings—as with contemporaneous litigation before the ITC and
some select instances of inter partes and post-grant review—courts
should even more strongly consider granting those agencies’ decisions
preclusive effect.
Using this rubric, courts would essentially force litigants to order
venues along two axes: from most developed (in terms of discovery and
motions) to the least, and from the most persuasive (or binding) to the
least. In doing so, courts would also end many of the abuses that stem
from the various stay standards in parallel proceedings. By refusing
stays for far-along litigation in federal court, courts would essentially
encourage patent litigants to resolve their disputes by trial or settlement
in federal court, before many agency decisions can likely be reached. 440
Similarly, by granting stays for recently filed federal litigation—and by
threatening the parties that any agency decision will either preclude or
decide their dormant federal claims—litigants would be encouraged to
resolve all of their outstanding issues in the agency proceeding, or
dismiss it entirely. 441 By combining reforms to courts’ consideration of
parallel stay and agency estoppel provisions, courts can effectively
streamline requests for stays while, ultimately, diminishing the use of
alternative fora of patent litigation.
CONCLUSION
Commentators

have

typically

viewed

patent

litigation—and,

439. See Soverain Software LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 660, 663 (E.D. Tex.
2005).
440. See Lemley, supra note 224, at 415 (noting that the average patent dispute is resolved within
a year).
441. See, e.g., Hahn & Singer, supra note 314, at 482 (“When a case is pursued in both venues,
the district court often stays the district court case for the duration of the ITC process, after which
the parties may move to have the court vacate the stay. A patent holder could learn through the ITC
determination that its case is strong or weak, and then settle the district court case accordingly.”).
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consequently, patent reform—as an essentially private law matter, with
administrative agencies forming only the occasional backdrop to
substantive control over litigation. But a synoptic view of the functions
administrative agencies play in patent disputes suggests that
administrative agencies—the PTO included—do manage, run, or see to a
wide variety of patent disputes. In short, administrative agencies
“administrate” patent litigation. 442 Agencies serve as gatekeepers of
litigation by overseeing patent listings or controlling the timing of
litigation in federal court. Agencies also provide courts, in a variety of
ways, with scientific and technical expertise important in patent
disputes. In some instances, agencies serve as panels of review of
already-completed patent litigation. And in others, agencies operate as
patent tribunals themselves, offering parallel and competing fora to
patent litigation before federal courts.
The interaction of these functions with courts themselves is complex
and, in many instances, yields several significant problems. Agencies
involved in patent disputes may be the subject of regulatory
gamesmanship, where litigants use neutrally crafted regulations to
artificially exclude competition. Agencies may also be the objects of
capture—both by industries routinely involved in patent litigation and
politicians looking to control patent litigation for public gain. And,
lastly, contemporaneous agency administration of patent disputes with
federal litigation may cloud opportunities for settlement and lead to
inconsistent judgments between the two.
Resolving these problems—i.e., “patent litigation reform”—requires a
longitudinal approach that cuts across agency functions. First, where
agencies do act as litigation gatekeepers, agencies should exercise their
powers with greater, and more nuanced, substantive oversight in an
effort to quell gamesmanship. Second, agencies with scientific and
technical expertise should make more forceful use of their talents in
federal court, either by conferring with the DOJ in more patent disputes
with the public’s interest at stake, or by deploying soft expertise that
courts can later rely on. And lastly, because the bulk of problems
associated with agency administration of patent litigation come from
agencies acting as alternative fora to patent disputes, agencies—and
courts—should streamline their efforts to diminish agencies’ power (and
efforts) as separate venues of patent litigation. Collectively, these
reforms demonstrate the importance of public law solutions to what
have, traditionally, been viewed as private law problems. They seek,
ultimately, to better administrate patent litigation.
442. Cf. 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 12, at 163 (defining “administrate” to
mean “[t]o manage or direct (affairs)”).

